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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

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***WORLD ECONOMY &  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS***

No 2, February 1988

# Soviet Union

## WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### No 2, February 1988

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## WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### English Summary of Major Articles

18160006a Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 2, Feb 88 (signed to press 20 Jan 88) pp 158-159

[Text] The editorial board of the journal devotes a section to the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which was signed on December 8 in Washington by M. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Ronald Reagan, President of the United States.

The journal publishes an interview with Academician E. Primakov entitled "The Breakthrough in Washington." E. Primakov a member of the team of experts at the Soviet-American Summit explains its importance for the fate of the world, evaluates it from the point of view of the historical dynamics of Soviet-American relations and points out its historical significance. He emphasizes that the breakthrough in Washington was possible thanks to the fact that new realities of world politics were fully taken into consideration and thoroughly taken into account in the Soviet political course. Firstly the unity of the world is maintained and even gaining strength despite the existence of the two opposing socio-political systems. Secondly: security in the present epoch can be achieved principally through political methods. Thirdly: military means which still remain important, should be based on the principle of reasonable adequacy. E. Primakov also emphasizes that the breakthrough in Washington was possible thanks to the creative mastering of the Leninist foreign-policy legacy and restoration of Leninist principles in Soviet diplomacy. E. Primakov elucidates the issue of verification and points out that what happened in Washington is a start towards the realization of the idea of a nuclear-free world and opens the doors for the continuation of the nuclear disarmament process. He points out that the breakthrough in Washington was a success as the American side this time displayed necessary realism and responsibility. It was stressed that an exchange of views is still progressing between the two states to clear up positions. This is very important for the continuation of the dialogue.

O. Bykov in the article "New Political Thinking in Action" summarizes the political results of the summit meeting in Washington based on Geneva and Reykjavik agreements. Precisely they made possible the steps aimed at improving strategic stability and lessening the danger of conflicts. They produced the first real results in nuclear disarmament. Thus the questions of disarmament, eliminating the nuclear threat, lessening tension and confrontation in the world, strengthening new approaches in building international relations were brought to the foreground. The INF Treaty has become a factor of regeneration of international relations, an example of broadest openness which contributes to

demilitarization of international relations. This epoch-making event made it possible to go over to the next phase of disarmament, primarily to a solution of the problem of a real and radical reduction in strategic offensive arms, laying a foundation for talks on a 50 percent cut in strategic weapons. The article points out that the logic of radical disarmament is inseparable from the logic of radical control. Between them exists a close and organic interrelation on a scale and depth hitherto unknown in international relations. The article points out that many issues are far from having been solved. It is necessary to remove some serious questions, giving rise for concern and to render assistance in the political settlement of regional conflicts. The author states that the movement for nuclear disarmament which has emerged beyond the framework of Soviet-American relations is now in the forefront of the world policy and is actively supported by many states and world public opinion.

V. Baranovsky. "Comments on the Treaty". The author examines the text of the Treaty and the three corresponding documents: Memorandum of understanding of the setting of initial data; Protocol on procedures governing the elimination of the missile systems and the Protocol regarding inspections. Three years after the Treaty comes into force the two sides will eliminate about 2700 missiles (1300 of them already deployed) and above 1100 launchers. Of principle importance is the fact that provision is made to eliminate two whole classes of nuclear missiles, and what is essential they are not obsolete but modern and highly effective war fighting means. The systems liable to destruction belong to a number of destabilizing kinds of weapons, hence the realization of the Treaty will contribute to scaling down the threat of nuclear war. The Treaty envisages an unparalleled on scale and depth effective system of verification based on the right to conduct on-site inspections. The Treaty is not only a major event for the Soviet-American relations but also an epoch making event for arms control and disarmament.

Yu. Borko. "On Certain Aspects of Research of West European Integration Processes". The author states that the West-European Integration processes have been studied successfully by Soviet scientists for more than 30 years. Nevertheless some highly important questions have been studied inadequately or demand their reconsideration. Particularly they are related to such aspects of the theme as the reasons for the support of integration by the majority of democratic forces in the European community countries, the role of international socio-political factors and mechanisms and correlation between the West-European integration and all-European cooperation. In the author's opinion West-European integration should be considered as a complex phenomenon of a multifaceted character where not only the basic economic factors influence social, political and ideological ones but they themselves are under the influence of the latter. West-European integration, capitalist in its socio-economic nature, to a certain extent also meets nation

interests of the participating countries, hence the support given to integration by the majority of workers' parties, trade unions and democratic intelligentsia. As far as inter-relation between West-European integration and all-European cooperation is concerned it is far from being one dimensional, and can be used both with the "plus" as well as "minus" sign. The Left-wingers' international dialogue which got a powerful impulse during the celebrations in Moscow of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution contributes to East-West European integration process of building an "all-European home."

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

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**Soviet-U.S. Washington Summit Seen as 'Historic'**

18160006b Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 2, Feb 88 (signed to press 20 Jan 88) pp 3-7

[Interview with Academician Ye.M. Primakov: "Breakthrough in Washington"]

[Text] [Question] Yevgeniy Maksimovich, as a member of the group of experts during the Soviet-American summit in Washington, you had an opportunity to observe what happened, close up, as they say. What do you see as the significance of this meeting for the fate of the world? How do you evaluate it from the viewpoint of the historical dynamics of Soviet-American relations and international relations as a whole?

[Answer] We have in the past become too accustomed to the frequent use in vain of the word "historic," often abusing it. But we may with every justification on this occasion speak of the historic nature of what occurred in Washington.

The point is that a kind of chain had existed until recently: the United States had set as its goal the rolling back of the Soviet Union with the use of power methods. For our part, this gave rise to military organizational development, which was justifiably seen as the principal method of safeguarding our security. But the next component of this chain was the fact that the West imposed on us an arms race. It assumed a symmetrical, mirror-like nature for the parties, which was explained not only by the S&T situation but also the "rules of the game" which had been imposed on us. This was painfully reflected in the economy, in the Soviet economy (which was, in addition, undergoing a period of stagnation), what is more, to a greater extent than in the American....

Yet the qualitative upgrading and unchecked quantitative proliferation of weapons of mass annihilation has already put the existence of human civilization in jeopardy. Consequently, the severing of this fatal chain is historically important not only for the survival of socialism but also for the survival of all mankind. Everything that contributes to this is, without exaggeration, of historic import.

[Question] Two years have elapsed since the proclamation in the well-known Soviet statement of 15 January 1986 of the program of a nuclear-free world. What in the light of the Washington negotiations are the prospects of progress toward this world? [Answer] When the statement of 15 January 1986 containing the call for a nuclear-free world was heard, many people believed that this idea was impracticable and utopian virtually. In any event, it was believed that no real movement in this direction would begin in the near, foreseeable future. However, this was not simply a call but a program, and not simply an abstract program but the formulation of specific tasks systematically buttressed by political actions. Naturally, life makes adjustments to this program. But what has now taken place in Washington testifies both to the practicability of the plans of nuclear disarmament and the USSR's consistency in their realization.

[Question] Two years ago, say, and one year ago, perhaps, one could hardly have imagined even the nature and scale of the breakthrough which was accomplished in Washington. How do you explain this?

[Answer] Primarily by the new realities of world politics and their increasingly full consideration in the foreign policy course of our party and the Soviet state. We have proceeded, particularly since the 27th congress, from the fact that, first, the unity of the world persists and is strengthening even, despite the existence of two opposite social and political systems; second, guaranteed security in the modern era may be achieved mainly by political means; third, military measures, which also retain their significance as yet, must be organized on the basis of a reasonable sufficiency. And the transition to a reasonable sufficiency, what is more, is the way toward optimization of the correlation of the resources spent on defense and on acceleration of our country's socioeconomic development.

Tremendous significance is attached to the creative assimilation of Lenin's foreign policy legacy and the revival in our diplomacy of Lenin's principles of the exercise of foreign policy. Let us take a new look, following a second reading, so to speak, at the Decree on Peace and V.I. Lenin's speech at the Second Congress of Soviets on 26 October 1917. Previously the meaning of the decree was frequently reduced merely to the "world without annexations and contributions" formula and was confined to this formula. This was the main point, of course. However, the palette characterizing the approach to international affairs contained in the Decree on Peace



is far brighter and richer. I refer to V.I. Lenin's direct formulation of the question of the need for a renunciation in diplomacy of categorical means and his point that our program and our proposals are by no means the sole ones and that everything proposed by the other side needs to be looked over and considered.

Plus Lenin's idea of glasnost and the openness of diplomacy. Of course, there are both diplomatic negotiations behind closed doors and an exchange of messages which are not necessarily made public right away. But when, following each summit, the Soviet leader, addressing everyone, recounts the peripeteias of this meeting, as was the case in Geneva, in Reykjavik and now in Washington, this involves the peoples in the diplomatic, political process.

The breakthrough in Washington was possible also because the American side, displaying a sense of realism and responsibility, went its part of the way on this occasion.

[Question] Do you believe that public opinion in the West played its part here also? And what was the influence of our readiness to accommodate it on the question of verification?

[Answer] I recall how in Geneva M.S. Gorbachev put for the first time the question to experts thus: why are we confining ourselves just to national means, why are we rejecting international forms of verification, on-site inspection and so forth? Indeed, as a result public opinion at times treated us as a "closed country." Therefore when we began to break down this wall of mistrust and when we adopted a new verification philosophy, this made a tremendous impression in the West. We said plainly that were we to come to an agreement with the United States, we would be "open" to verification by all available methods. But if we are prepared to allow ourselves to be monitored, we ourselves insist on adequate verification methods. We thereby immediately drove our opponent into a corner. And what was the result? It turned out that our negotiating partners were not prepared for such far-reaching verification. I, for example, believe that the Americans are now far less adjusted to consent to verification than we.

It would seem that the course and results of the Washington summit show how wrong is the idea that public opinion in the West does not participate directly in the process of preparation of foreign policy decisions.

[Question] Why was what was impossible in Reykjavik possible in Washington?

[Answer] It seems to me that it is not only a question of the fact that at that time the Americans were simply not ready for agreement on the entire spectrum of our proposals: on intermediate-range missiles, on strategic offensive arms and in respect of space. This was too

much of a surprise for them. Our perestroika, our democratization, our glasnost had not yet really come into play. And this, as it has transpired, is a factor of colossal impact on people's frame of mind. Nor had realistic elements in the American leadership yet crystallized out at that time. All these factors manifested themselves in Washington, however.

When M.S. Gorbachev arrived in Washington, it was already clear that not only would the INF Treaty be signed but that agreements in principle on a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive arms linked with the ABM Treaty would be achieved also. The instructions to the delegations in Geneva to draw up an agreement which would commit the parties to compliance with the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972 and not withdraw therefrom for an agreed period of time recorded in the joint statement is of exceptional importance.

The signing of the first treaty eliminating two classes of nuclear arms is significant not only in itself, it opens the doors to a continuation of the nuclear disarmament process. A breach has been made, but the difficulties—considerable, moreover—on this path have to be seen also. We will be encountering them, possibly, when concluding a treaty on strategic offensive arms. Perhaps this will even be the main theater in which the American right wishes to do battle.

[Question] You had an opportunity to perceive directly Americans' reaction to the Soviet leader's visit and the impressive displays of liking and respect for him. What impact could this have on the alignment and delineation of political forces in the United States on questions of the development of Soviet-American relations and nuclear disarmament prospects?

[Answer] Both on the eve and during M.S. Gorbachev's visit much was written about the increased assertiveness of forces of the right in the United States and a variety of provocative escapades. All this took place. But it was not this which was the main aspect determining the atmosphere in the United States during the summit: it was distinguished by benevolence toward our country. The scale of the popularity of M.S. Gorbachev revealed by public opinion polls is striking also. I would like to emphasize that the results of our perestroika, our glasnost and our democratization have had a direct effect here. This shows once again how important it is to in no way retreat from the line adopted by the party—and not only from domestic but international considerations also. Only thus can we strengthen our international positions and take big steps forward—toward the stabilization of the world situation.

Something else is interesting and highly important also—the new dimension of the election atmosphere in the United States. A leading presidential candidate—M. Dukakis—declares, for example, speaking on television: we need to elect as president a person who can for 4 years

sit down opposite M.S. Gorbachev and tackle issues with him in a positive manner. And to elect, moreover, a president who must be equipped for this job and who is well trained, educated and sufficiently knowledgeable. Where is the former presentation of the issue, according to which the U.S. President was obliged to bang his fist on the negotiating table and be incredibly "strong" in order to be able to impose his will? There is no such presidential image—in the speeches of serious politicians, at least.

[Question] What do you see as the main consequences of M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Washington for the domestic political situation in the United States?

[Answer] I consider the split in the conservative camp such a result. Reagan has been forced to distance himself from those who supported and "built" him up. Responding to attacks from the far right, in one of his interviews given on the eve of the meeting Reagan accused them of considering war with the Soviet Union inevitable and of not being primed to understand the essence of the accords with the USSR.

All serious Americans with whom I talked were convinced that there had in some sense been a turnabout. In what sense? R. Reagan's assumption of office marked a manifest shift to the right. Ultraconservative figures came at that time to appear respectable. They are now manifestly losing this "respectability."

[Question] How do you assess the chances of ratification of the INF Treaty?

[Answer] This question naturally preoccupies everyone. I would not like to give the impression that the right have ended their resistance, that they will not put pressure on and that they will go "underground." Resistance is already being offered, and there are already attacks on the treaty, albeit given a new alignment of forces and in new forms.

The first of them is traditional for Americans: they have to periodically offend us in some way and speak, for example, about problems of emigration, even without regard, furthermore, for the changes which have actually been taking place in this field recently. The second is when Reagan himself and those closest to him throw the far right a "bone," attacking the USSR. And the third are attacks on the treaty.

I was talking with a figure of pronounced rightwing views, who said: "I will not be able to vote against the treaty directly in the Senate. The treaty has been signed by the President and is supported by the bulk of the population. What we will do under these conditions is introduce amendments. The amendments will be partly such as to show the electorate that we are 'as good as the rest' and partly of a fundamental nature aimed at undermining the treaty."

[Question] You took part in the work of the Soviet-American Subcommittee on Regional Conflicts. Did the discussion of this problem introduce anything fundamentally new? What is the situation which is taking shape here?

[Answer] I recall the start, when the Americans were determining the order of priority of the discussions on the eve of the Geneva meeting: "First, regional conflicts, then, confidence-building, then, arms reduction." The United States has now, it may be said, abandoned this approach. A sensible position has prevailed: no component must contradict another, it being necessary to proceed in all directions simultaneously, preserving arms reduction as the arterial direction. We upheld this position right from the start, in Geneva even.

Now about the so-called "flash points." In some of them—Afghanistan and Cambodia—processes of national reconciliation capable of unblocking political settlement processes are under way. One American asked in the fervor of argument: "Civil war has historically never ended in national reconciliation, there have been no such instances in history." A difficult question, truly. But never previously in such conflicts has the international, foreign element been present to such a tremendous extent, becoming at times predominant even. And this alters the situation. I am seriously hoping for the success of the national reconciliation processes.

But, another example. Upon discussion with the Americans of the Afghan problem we encountered much evidence that far from everyone in the United States wants our contingent to leave Afghanistan. Very many people believe that the continued military presence is weakening the USSR. Why, for example, have arms supplies to the rebels reached a peak precisely now? Why is it that it is now that they are being supplied with the most sophisticated weapons? Why is it now that the Americans are unwilling to consider that it might be possible by way of their suspending arms supplies to make the main rebel groups, which are refusing to joint a coalition government, more tractable, more flexible?

During discussion of the situation in the Near East we counterposed to the American policy of separate deals the sole path, in our opinion, leading to peace in the region—the convening of an international conference.

Without going into detail on the questions discussed, I would like to say that the discussions conducted in the subcommittee were to the point. We have a mass of disagreements and were unable to dispose of them. But an exchange of opinions to ascertain positions is under way. And this is very important and will continue.

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**Positive Effects of Perestroika in Foreign Policy**  
*18160006c Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 2, Feb 88 (signed to press 20 Jan 88) pp 8-20*

[Article by O. Bykov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "The New Political Thinking in Action"]

[Text] New political thinking. This concept became a part of the international vocabulary quite recently. Not as a sonorous, communicative slogan but as a fitting reflection of the acute objective need for abrupt changes for the better on the world scene. And as the acknowledged need for a sober look at the realities of our contradictory and explosive, but interdependent and integral world in order to extricate international relations from the vicious circle of confrontation and arms race, prevent a slide toward nuclear catastrophe and ensure reliable general security.

The creative process of a rethinking of the aims and means of world politics was initiated by the CPSU Central Committee April Plenum (1985) and the 27th party congress. Powerful stimulus to this process was imparted by the speeches of M.S. Gorbachev, his report at the ceremonial session on the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, the article "Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World" and the book "Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and the World."

As in real life, there are in politics no miracles. Even the most brilliant concept, but one which was profitable merely to one side, could not have gained a response at all ends of the world, and in such a short time, what is more. But the innovative initiative emanating from the Soviet Union was consonant with the aspirations of the peoples of the world inasmuch as it appeals to the realistic people of our world for prudence and assigns priority to interests common to all mankind. Such cannot be dismissed in passing as "Moscow propaganda." The vital necessity for thinking and acting in a new manner is perceived as an imperative not just for one country but for the whole world community. Obviously, it was for this reason that the new philosophy of international development gained such widespread recognition so rapidly.

The rapid growth of support for the new political thinking was also brought about by the fact that the need therefore had ripened long since. The old concepts and methods of solving international problems had shown their futility. Negotiations were at a standstill. Much precious time had been lost, and advantage had not been taken of auspicious opportunities. And yet the self-powered machinery of confrontation was inexorably gaining momentum, the world situation remained tense and the danger of total annihilation was looming increasingly menacingly over mankind. What was needed was an emphatic change toward stable detente and real disarmament.

Mere recognition of the need therefore was not enough, of course, for such a change. Persevering, unremitting efforts, the surmounting of the colossal inertia of political confrontation and military competition and movement from the new conceptual standpoints to a new practical policy and specific accords were needed. It is toward this that the assertive international activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state has been directed for the past 2 years. Our large-scale foreign policy initiatives and endeavor to clear away obstacles, achieve mutual understanding and formulate a balance of interests are oriented toward interaction with all states which display a readiness for this and, naturally, with the United States, which together with the Soviet Union occupies a central place in the system of safeguarding international security. Despite the difficulties and obstacles, there has been movement. The efforts have borne fruit.

The signing in Washington of the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles is an important frontier in international development and a victory for the new political thinking. A practical start has been made on deliverance from weapons of mass annihilation, and a big step toward a secure world has been taken.

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The long and difficult path to Washington ran via Geneva and Reykjavik. These were essential stages and confrontations and convergences of the positions of the two powers with the mightiest potentials of mutual and general annihilation. There was a strenuous, intensive dialogue of the leaders of the USSR and the United States weighed down by a heavy burden of opposition, but spurred on by the harsh necessity for finding a sensible way out of the absurd and extremely dangerous situation into which confrontation had driven their countries and, together with them, all mankind. The dialogue was stimulated by the new political thinking, but the latter was itself developed and enriched with increasingly profound content to a considerable extent under the impact of the direct contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The first meeting of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan took place in November 1985 in Geneva. It meant far more than the simple acquaintanceship of the leaders of the two great powers and a resumption following a long interval of the process of negotiations at the highest political level. The Geneva meeting permitted joint recognition of the most profound changes throughout the world situation as the point of departure for progress toward accords. The leaders of the two powers declared that nuclear war must never be unleashed and that it could have no winners. They stressed the importance of the prevention of any war between the USSR and the United States—nuclear or conventional—and undertook not to seek military superiority.



The Geneva meeting showed that the security sphere, the central component of which are the curbing and build-down of military, primarily nuclear, competition, was and remains determining in Soviet-American relations. The realities of the modern world required a fundamental revision of the traditional notions concerning security—from both the USSR and the United States and from all other states. It is no longer possible today to think of one's own security in isolation from general security, even less to the detriment of the security of others. Security now is interdependent, integral and indivisible: greater for some and less for others is not only impermissible but disadvantageous also. A security imbalance creates dangerous instability. Previously it was different, and it was an endeavor to safeguard primarily one's own security without worrying about all the others which was predominant. We now have to disaccustom ourselves to such egocentrism and think in categories of common security—national, mutual and general.

In the spirit of a profound rethinking of the realities of present-day world development the Soviet Union displayed a firm resolve to contribute to the maximum to an improvement in the international situation, overcome confrontational processes, rein in the arms race and avert the threat of nuclear annihilation. The set of its large-scale foreign policy acts of a high-minded nature, the center of which was the statement of 15 January 1986 containing a program for stage-by-stage progress toward a nuclear-free world, was subordinated to these goals. Having put forward the constructive idea of the creation of an all-embracing system of international security, the 27th party congress charted as the arterial direction of Soviet foreign policy realization of a program of nuclear disarmament. It was expressed in a number of specific proposals of the USSR on the entire range of problems of arms limitation and reduction, a winding down of military confrontation and a strengthening of mutual trust.

However, reciprocal movement on the part of the United States was not observed. The Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms idled. Progress toward agreements was not observed. The U.S. Administration continued meanwhile to develop military programs.

Under these conditions the Soviet leadership proposed an immediate top-level meeting in Reykjavik in October 1986. The USSR submitted thereat not individual questions of arms limitation but an integral package of radical nuclear disarmament proposals. It proposed a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms; strict compliance with the ABM Treaty; the deliverance of Europe from intermediate-range missiles; a negotiated ban on nuclear testing.

There was much criticism and doubt in respect of the broad, comprehensive nature of the Soviet proposals, particularly immediately following the Reykjavik meeting. The absence at the outcome thereof of specific accords was seen as evidence that obtaining "too much

too quickly" is not possible. Regret was expressed that it was not possible, in view of this, for agreement to be reached on a minimum program at least, namely, the conclusion of a treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Such an outcome of the meeting might have been imagined. A modest, predictable outcome, in the traditions of cautious step-by-step advance. But it was, after all, essential to seek something entirely different—a fundamental change in the direction of real disarmament. And an agreement on one issue, albeit important in itself, divorced from the entire set of problems of nuclear disarmament could not have had such an effect. Such a document could, of course, have been signed, but it would surely have been followed by a protracted period of vapid negotiations for the purpose of groping hesitantly toward subsequent accords on individual issues.

The Soviet Union's initiative was aimed at a large-scale conceptual breakthrough in the nuclear disarmament sphere. It was distinguished by breadth and boldness, but at the same time was strictly realistic and adequately reflected the balance of security interests which had objectively taken shape between the USSR and the United States. The Soviet package of proposals oriented toward a radical build-down of nuclear potentials at the same time took into consideration the concerns of both sides and mapped out approaches to the formulation of compromise.

Turning once again today to the results of the Reykjavik meeting, it can from the standpoints of what was achieved at the subsequent meeting in Washington be confirmed with full certainty that the broad and radical approach to the solution of the central problem of international security was opportune and necessary at that time. Granted that no documents were signed, but something greater and immeasurably more promising was achieved—the sides' deep-lying community of interests in the key areas of nuclear disarmament was ascertained and ways of the convergence of their positions were charted.

Indeed, agreement in principle was achieved concerning a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms and subsequently the elimination of the remaining components of ground-, sea- and air-based strategic forces. The parties agreed to reduce to zero the number of their intermediate-range missiles in Europe and to begin negotiations on shorter-range missiles. Mutual understanding was recorded on nonwithdrawal for a period of 10 years from the ABM Treaty. The possibility of movement toward the banning of nuclear tests, beginning with a limitation of nuclear explosions in terms of quantity and yield, was opened somewhat. Extraordinarily important was the mutual understanding that deep cuts in nuclear arms require strict verification by all means—national, bilateral and multilateral, including on-site inspection.

No agreements were signed on these cardinal problems of nuclear disarmament in Reykjavik. And it was not only and not so much even a question of the American



"star wars" program, which runs counter to the trend toward a build-down of the arms race. The overall political and strategic situation, the state of Soviet-American relations, the domestic political situation in the United States—none of these had yet matured for the realization of such wide-ranging plans. But the negotiations in Reykjavik were not in vain. Their exceptional nature and true novelty were expressed in the fact that the examination and solution of nuclear disarmament problems were put on a practical footing and raised to a considerably higher—political and not military-technical only—level. From the frontiers of accord reached in the Icelandic capital the road was opened to a radical reduction in nuclear arsenals. And this road led to the U.S. capital.

The interval between the meetings in Reykjavik and Washington was short by historical standards. But how much occurred in this time, what significant progress! Not automatic and not smooth progress, it goes without saying. The forces of militarism and anti-Sovietism inveighed fiercely against the improvement which had shown through in the outlook for detente and disarmament. But after Reykjavik, the ice of confrontation binding international relations finally melted.

The movement toward nuclear disarmament emerged not only from the labyrinths of negotiatory technical details toward the level of important political decisions. It surged beyond the framework of Soviet-American relations, advanced to the forefront of world politics and gained the active support of many states and world public opinion. The task of the deliverance from weapons of annihilation of civilization and life on our planet itself assumed truly global proportions in its organic combination with the task of humanization of international relations, eradication of power politics and the establishment of peaceful coexistence as the highest universal principle of interstate relations. This portentous trend was reflected, as in focus, in the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free of nuclear weapons signed in the course of the top-level Soviet-Indian meeting in November 1986—a document of the new political thinking emanating from the paramount significance of values common to all mankind and the need for unification of efforts for the building of a secure world.

Even in the world situation which had changed for the better the Washington meeting would have been impossible without the process stock in the sphere of disarmament and security which it was essential to create by the parties' common efforts. A big contribution to this cause was made by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies. Steps in response followed, albeit not immediately and not in all areas, on the part of the United States and its North Atlantic alliance allies, among which the FRG and Great Britain need to be given their due primarily.

The Soviet Union did everything within its power to facilitate the removal of a number of essential differences impeding the formulation of an accord on intermediate-range missiles. The question of their elimination was separated from the set of proposals discussed in Reykjavik for independent solution, regardless of the progress and outcome of the negotiations on strategic and space-based arms. Agreement was reached on the elimination together with intermediate-range missiles of shorter-range missiles also—operational-tactical missiles. The USSR expressed a willingness to accede to the destruction of the corresponding missiles not only in the European but also Asian part of its territory. The procedures for the elimination of missile systems and for inspections were agreed, and an understanding was reached on the determination of source data. Thus the main contours of the future INF Treaty were outlined. By the end of December 1987 this document had essentially been made ready for signing.

But this alone was not enough for ensuring the continuousness and ongoing nature of the nuclear disarmament process. Although the question of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles had been separated as an independent issue, this had been done on the Soviet side by no means to isolate it from the general process of a radical reduction in nuclear arms. On the contrary, the solution of this question was seen as a catalyst of the entire nuclear disarmament process, primarily of progress toward deep cuts in strategic offensive arms given strict compliance with the ABM Treaty. It was for this reason that the Soviet leadership persistently sought and ultimately achieved a position where the actual content of the Washington negotiations was not only the completion of one phase of the build-down of nuclear potentials at the intermediate- and shorter-range missile level but also a transition to subsequent phases thereof—at the strategic arms level. Resting content with recording what had been achieved was not possible, what was needed was powerful impetus to the continuation and deepening of progress in the disarmament sphere, beginning with nuclear disarmament, in respect of the entire range. Intensive negotiations of E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz, who met in Moscow with M.S. Gorbachev, and in Washington, with R. Reagan, were devoted to the difficult coordination of the issues associated with this. As a result there was a pronounced rapprochement of positions in respect of determination of the parameters of a 50 percent strategic arms reduction, including limits to the number of warheads per the different components of each party's strategic forces.

The preparation of the productive meeting in Washington had been notably facilitated also by other measures implemented by the Soviet Union, particularly in the sphere of the openness of military activity and the strengthening of mutual trust. American specialists were authorized access to top-secret facilities—nuclear firing ranges, radar stations, chemical weapons dumps and so forth.

It is difficult to exaggerate the tremendous positive impact on Soviet-American relations, as on the entire world situation, of the profound changes in the Soviet Union—the revolutionary renewal of socialist society, perestroika, glasnost and democratization. The efficacy of the Soviet peace-loving policy increased immeasurably as the grim consequences of Stalin's personality cult were overcome, the extraneous features of the times of voluntarism, subjectivism and stagnation were purged and we rid ourselves of outmoded foreign policy and propaganda clichés. The appearance of the USSR changed appreciably for the better in the eyes of the world community and the majority of Americans. Never was the popularity of a Soviet leader so high in the United States.

The wind of change has touched the United States also. The rightwing conservative policy within the country and the confrontational course in the international arena, which even recently seemed permanent and unbending, began under the pressure of a number of factors to undergo a certain adjustment. The accumulation of difficult economic problems and the growth of social problems were reflected in the political decision-making process. The struggle over such questions as the allocation of resources for military and socioeconomic purposes, limitation of the growth of the already huge national debt and unprecedented federal budget deficit and the implementation of tax reform intensified in Congress, which was controlled by the Democratic Party. Disagreements between significant numbers of legislators and the White House in the sphere of international security and arms control intensified. The Senate and the House of Representatives passed amendments to a number of bills aimed at a cutback in military appropriations and compliance with existing arms limitation agreements.

The tightening of the policy of confrontation threatened to drive the United States back to positions of confrontation, from which, as practice has shown, it is impossible to guarantee true security. Persisting in its nonacceptance of the realities of our time, the United States counterposed itself to the entire world community. The crisis of power politics was interwoven with domestic policy complications. The Reagan administration was dealt a heavy blow by the scandal surrounding the clandestine illegal sale of weapons to Iran and the transfer of some of the money obtained to the anti-Sandinista counterrevolutionary bands. The upheavals in the country's leading circles brought about by the "Iran-Contra" affair led to pronounced changes within the administration. There were changes at the political forefront: representatives of the militant forces—C. Weinberger, W. Casey, D. Regan and R. Perle—were removed therefrom, and such figures of a more moderate persuasion as G. Shultz, G. Bush, F. Carlucci and H. Baker moved up. There was a split among the right also. Their extremist wing, which had always supported R. Reagan, is now showering him with insults for his participation in the formulation of agreements with the

Soviet Union on disarmament issues. At the same time, however, it was on these issues that the U.S. President gained broad support among the American people. This created in the country on the eve of the summit an auspicious moral and political climate, which had not been observed throughout the many years of intensive opposition and strain in relations between the two states.

## II

The signing in Washington of the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles was an important frontier in the struggle for disarmament and turning point in all international development. Born of the new political thinking, the treaty itself has become a substantial factor of the renewal of international relations and their deliverance from the channel of power rivalry to the broad expanse of constructive cooperation under conditions of lasting peace.

The exceptional nature of the agreement is primarily the fact that it represents the first mutual decision in history on the physical destruction, and in a significant quantity, moreover, of lethal weapons. A practical start has been made on nuclear disarmament, precisely disarmament, and not the limitation of or reduction in stockpiled arms, as was the case previously. Two whole classes of nuclear weapons are being completely erased from the military balance. As distinct from the practice of agreements of the past, these arms will be eliminated in toto, the customary problems of compliance with established ceilings and regulation of their further modernization thereby being removed. Together with the missiles their launchers and support equipment and structures will be eliminated, and the nuclear warheads will be removed from the missiles which have been deployed. Intermediate- and shorter-range missiles will no longer be manufactured.

The very effect of realization of the "zero" concept of disarmament is extraordinarily important. Quite recently even the idea of deliverance from if only some stockpiled nuclear weapons seemed to many people utopian. It did not jibe not only with the perception of giant nuclear arsenals as symbols of the permanency of military confrontation. The entire experience of previous negotiations and agreements showed how difficult it is—even on the basis of equality and reciprocity—to limit nuclear arms, not to mention a sharp reduction therein. The belief had taken root that, having once emerged, any nuclear weapons system would unswervingly be deployed and remain part of the effective combat strength until its obsolescence, and then a more sophisticated system would have to come to replace it. And so on ad infinitum.

It was difficult under such conditions to refute the proposition that the aspiration to preserve existing missiles at any price, whether modernized or obsolescent, emphatically ruled out any hopes of reducing to zero if

only one class thereof without its replacement by weapons of the next generation. The treaty signed in Washington demolishes the stereotype of the virtually fatal predetermination of the nuclear arms race and proves that it is necessary and possible to physically dismantle arsenals thereof, withdraw entire components therefrom and move stage by stage toward a nuclear-free world.

The conclusion of the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles will serve as a highly useful model at the time of formulation of subsequent disarmament agreements—both nuclear and conventional—when it will be necessary to deal also with other asymmetries and partial imbalances within the framework of general military-strategic balance. According to the treaty, the USSR is to eliminate approximately twice as many missiles (deployed and nondeployed) and remove three times as many warheads from deployed missiles as the United States. However, the equation of security interests does not, naturally, amount to the number of delivery systems and warheads. Not only the number of missiles of the corresponding classes but also the geography of their deployment, capacity for destroying this target or the other and flight time are important. And here also there are many discrepancies. Although the Soviet Union has an appreciable quantitative advantage in terms of these missiles, they can create strategic pressure only on the United States' allies, but cannot, in view of their insufficient range, be employed against the territory of the United States itself, whereas the latter, given a lesser quantity of similar missiles deployed in West Europe, is capable of delivering a nuclear attack on vitally important targets in the European part of the USSR 8-10 minutes after launch.

The "zero" solution removes the asymmetry and imbalance together with the dangers ensuing therefrom for both sides. A sensible and just solution. It cuts through one of the tightest knots of the nuclear confrontation and simultaneously will help us move away from the unproductive, "arithmetical" method of comparison merely of quantitative parameters of the parties' operational possibilities in the course of subsequent negotiations on other disarmament problems.

The complete confiscation of two classes of missiles from the total nuclear potential of the USSR and the United States lowers the level thereof only negligibly, of course (although the withdrawal from the effective combat strength of a sum total of more than 2,000 nuclear weapons is in itself no mean achievement!). What is highly material is something else. The process of actual disarmament which is beginning will not only lead to a diminution in the quantity of weapons of mass destruction but will simplify to a large extent the structure of the balance of the remaining nuclear forces. And this will markedly strengthen strategic stability and create conditions conducive to further deep cuts in nuclear and other arms. Indeed, the equation merely of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons will become considerably simpler and more stable and controllable than given the presence

therein of the highly destabilizing intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. This nuclear equation will be further simplified as actual disarmament is effected.

The fundamental novelty of the treaty signed in Washington is also the fact that it provides for the strictest verification measures. Such a thing is historically unprecedented! The USSR and the United States agreed to conduct on-site inspection over a period of 13 years. Inspections to monitor source data, the elimination and nonmanufacture of the missiles and to confirm the fact of elimination of missile operating bases and support facilities are to be carried out for the purpose of unserving compliance with the treaty's provisions.

The extent and nature of verification are truly unprecedented. But then so is the complete destruction of two entire classes of nuclear weapons. The logic of radical disarmament is inseparable from the logic of radical verification, there is a close organic relationship between them. And it is extraordinarily important that this truth, which was for many years fiercely disputed by the opponents of a winding down of the arms race, has now been recognized by both parties and has assumed the form of mutual commitments. Verification has ceased to be a stumbling block en route to disarmament. Having become an example of the high effectiveness of interconnected disarmament and verification measures, the treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles raises to a qualitatively higher level the openness and trust so necessary for consistent progress toward a world without wars and weapons.

Material also is the treaty's contribution to the creation of an all-embracing system of international security. This is, perhaps, its main political dimension. Aside from the fact that the very signing of the treaty had a direct salutary impact on the world situation, it is contributing to the general demilitarization of international relations. The destruction of weapons of warfare lessens the dependence of international security on nuclear deterrence and strengthens its political foundations and facilitates a way out of protracted confrontation and the intensive development of the positive interaction of states in the interests of mutual and general security. It is particularly important that this affects primarily Europe, where the main forces of the two military-political groupings are in direct contact. The deliverance of the continent from two classes of nuclear weapons is remarkable not only in respect of a lessening of the danger threatening it: the preparation of the treaty in the course of the Soviet-American dialogue was accompanied by inter-allied consultations within the framework of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic alliance.

Gloomy prognostications were being expressed quite recently even concerning the inevitability of the opposition of "Europe" to the Soviet Union and the United States in view of the incompatibility of geopolitical



interests, which were to be manifested pointedly allegedly in connection with the prospect of an accord being reached on the two classes of nuclear missiles. Nor was there any shortage of predictions of the inevitable collapse of the negotiations in view of the negative attitude toward them in West Europe. It was also hinted that both Washington and Moscow were building their hopes on the "driving of wedges" into the military-political alliances confronting them.

Life confounded the forecasts drawn up per the prescriptions of the period of unlimited confrontation. Certain discord arose, of course. It could not have failed to have arisen against the backdrop of the continuing confrontation. But the overall outcome was entirely positive. The USSR interacted constantly with its Warsaw Pact allies and conducted an active exchange of opinions with West European states. The United States also held intensive discussions with its NATO partners. Close contacts between West European countries were maintained simultaneously. As a result the necessary common denominator of security interests based on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles was found. The allies of both the USSR and the United States contributed to the formulation of the treaty. Given general consent, it was envisaged that on-site inspections would be carried out, besides the territory of the Soviet Union and the United States, on the territory also of the countries where the missiles to be eliminated are deployed: the GDR and the CSSR on the one hand, the FRG, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands on the other. Here we have a model of political cooperation which is essential for further progress in the sphere of nuclear and conventional disarmament and a strengthening of international security in Europe and throughout the world.

It is difficult to exaggerate the treaty's role as a catalyst of the process of a build-down of the arms race. It is extremely necessary for imparting dynamism and irreversibility to this process. Previously each nuclear arms limitation agreement was followed by a long interval—of 7-8 years on average. In this time the development of military technology was able to considerably outpace the course of the negotiations. A decisive offensive along the entire disarmament front is now an urgent necessity in the face of the monstrous accumulation of nuclear arms. And not by the old methods, furthermore, of a cautious, gradual feeling out of the zones in which a certain limitation of the continued buildup of nuclear potentials is possible but by new, radical, large-scale steps not extended over many years—such as the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. Having solved one most acute problem of nuclear disarmament, it thereupon, in the context of the top-level negotiations in Washington, put on the agenda the next question, central, what is more—a sharp reduction in strategic offensive arms.

### III

The problem of a 50 percent reduction in strategic arms was really at the center of the Washington negotiations.

The parties' positions on a number of key questions clashed sharply once again, as in Reykjavik, and differences were overcome with difficulty. But there was as a whole significant progress. The agreements in principle reached at the meeting in the Icelandic capital and the experience of formulation of the INF Treaty contributed to the fruitfulness of the mutual efforts.

The main contours of an agreement on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms had been outlined prior to the Washington meeting even. Agreement had been reached on the effective limits for delivery systems—1,600 carrying 6,000 nuclear weapons. Sublimits on heavy missiles, the rules for counting bombers and much else had been agreed.

Much that was new was added to these accords in Washington. After many years of fruitless search a way was finally found out of the impasse in which the question of sea-launched cruise missiles had found itself. The American side had been stubbornly unwilling to include them within the framework of an agreement, but the rapid development of this extremely destabilizing weapons system threatened to undermine the entire balance of strategic forces, particularly given a sharp lowering of the level thereof. A 50-percent reduction in ground- and sea-launched ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles (given the elimination in accordance with the treaty which has already been signed of ground-based cruise missiles) could have increased appreciably the role of sea-launched cruise missiles. Now these missiles also have been put within a strict framework, and effective limits over and above the 6,000 warheads on other strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems have been determined for them. It has been agreed to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verifying the implementation of these limitations with regard for the latest achievements of science and technology.

Appreciable progress was seen at the meeting in Washington in the business of specification of the structure of a future treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms. A ceiling of 4,900 for the total quantity of ICBM and SLBM warheads within the framework of the total level of 6,000 nuclear weapons was determined. The rules of counting existing air-launched ballistic and cruise missiles were agreed.

Understanding was reached on the formulation of strict verification measures—in development of the corresponding provisions of the INF Treaty. Such measures are to include an exchange of source data, the monitoring of these data with the aid of inspections, on-site observation of the elimination of strategic arms, continuous on-site observation of production and support facilities, on-site inspection with a short warning time, the prohibition of concealment for the purpose of making verification by national technical facilities more difficult and an expansion of observation using such facilities.



All this is essential for the detailed completion of the wording of a future treaty on a limitation of and reduction in strategic offensive arms. But it is perfectly understandable that the most important component of such a treaty is, as was clear initially and as was highlighted particularly distinctly by the dramatic collision of positions in Reykjavik, the organic relationship between deep cuts in strategic arms and prevention of an arms race in space. A certain movement was seen on this pivotal issue in Washington.

The previous history of the question, complex and contradictory, is remembered by everyone. It is full of acute, tense struggle. It essentially depends on its outcome whether there will be a subsequent nuclear disarmament agreement or not. The persistent, purposeful efforts on the Soviet side are aimed at ensuring dependable strategic stability, which is possible only given compliance with the ABM Treaty. The American side is continuing to implement the program within the SDI framework, which is fraught with the risk of deployment of antimissile defenses on this scale or the other. And this would inevitably undermine strategic stability and the principles of the ABM Treaty. The difference of opinions is fundamental and cannot be avoided.

At the same time the results of the Washington meeting showed that, granted all its seriousness, this difference cannot be seen as insurmountable. On the contrary, the urgent and immediate need for nuclear disarmament is prompting the even more active continuation of the search for a mutually acceptable solution. Account also has to be taken here of certain recent trends adding new aspects to the already quite familiar SDI problem.

It would be a dangerous illusion to proceed from the fact that the "star wars" program will itself become outdated in the very near future. It continues to be pushed vigorously by highly influential forces, which have a material interest in its realization. Its potentially destabilizing essence has not changed. But the conditions of its implementation are changing. The SDI is falling into a context of Soviet-American relations and the internal development of the United States in which it may not only lose its capacity for rigidly blocking the way to nuclear disarmament but may itself be subject to the fettering influence of positive processes.

As long as the SDI research program does not go beyond the limits of what is permitted by the ABM Treaty, it does not upset strategic stability. Basic research is being conducted in the USSR also. But the Soviet leadership declares with all certainty that it does not intend creating space-based arms per the example of the United States and calls on it to do likewise. If, however, Washington fails to reciprocate, fitting measures which will not copy the SDI and which will be considerably less costly, but sufficiently effective for neutralizing the American

space-based arms system in the event of its deployment will be adopted. This possibility has to be reckoned with. It is making its mark on the prospects of realization of the SDI program.

Other serious obstacles in the way of the creation of the United States' space-based arms, primarily of a technical nature, are arising also. The development of various ABM facilities is revealing the growing complexity of the supersystems which are being designed and making probable an elongation of the timeframe of realization of the planned projects. The already astronomically high estimates of possible expenditure on the deployment of even the most limited versions of an ABM defense, not to mention full-scale versions, are rising continuously also. The domestic political struggle in connection with the SDI, in the course of which the positions of its opponents are strengthening noticeably, is intensifying. Congress is cutting appropriations for the SDI and making amendments to bills aimed at ensuring strict compliance with the ABM Treaty.

Tangible progress toward the conclusion of a treaty on strategic offensive arms, given unfailing continuation of the ABM Treaty practice, could exert a growing restraining influence on the SDI. And it was in this direction that movement at the Washington negotiations was seen.

With regard for the preparations for a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms the leaders of the USSR and the United States concentrated attention on the formulation of an agreement which would oblige the parties to comply with the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972 in the process of research, development and testing, which are permitted them, and not withdraw from it for an agreed period of time. This was recorded in the top-level Soviet-American joint statement, as, equally, was the agreement that 3 years prior to the expiry of the agreed period of time of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty intensive discussions of strategic stability would begin, and after this period, furthermore, if the parties do not arrive at a different arrangement, each of them will have the right to itself determine its *modus operandi*. The agreement should have the same legal status as the strategic offensive arms treaty and the ABM Treaty. In this spirit the leaders of the two states instructed their delegations at the Geneva negotiations to examine these questions first. The Soviet Union proceeds from the reality of the task of preparing the corresponding treaty for signing in Moscow during the return visit of the U.S. President in the first half of 1988.

#### IV

The top-level Washington meeting extended and stimulated the political dialogue between the USSR and the United States. Taking what had been achieved in Geneva and Reykjavik as a basis, the leaders of the two powers went further in the direction of disarmament and the strengthening of strategic stability, prevention of any

war—nuclear or conventional—and a lessening of the danger of the outbreak of conflicts. They emphasized once again the particular responsibility borne by the Soviet Union and the United States for the search for realistic ways out of confrontation and the building of a safer world for mankind embarking upon the third millennium.

The Washington meeting testified that certain progress has been made in the relations of the USSR and the United States. The mutual intention to contribute to the constructive development of these relations was expressed in the course of the negotiations. Specific accords were achieved on a number of questions—in the sphere of scientific cooperation, cultural exchange and contacts between people. The possibilities of an expansion of trade and economic relations were discussed. At the same time there has as yet been no fundamental change in Soviet-American relations. Many serious disagreements in them have yet to be overcome.

Such is the reality. And an objective perception thereof is an indispensable prerequisite of the new political thinking. But it is from the standpoints of the new political thinking that ascertainment of the existing situation is insufficient, what is required is an active, creative, exceptional approach to the solution of the vitally important problems facing the USSR, the United States and the entire world community. It was a mutual aspiration to determine such constructive approaches which was demonstrated at the Washington meeting. As a result of the negotiations mutual understanding broadened, the spheres of differences narrowed and questions which remain points of disagreement were extricated from the stalemate to which they had been driven by confrontation. Dynamism was imparted to the process of the positive interaction of the USSR and the United States.

The Washington meeting served as powerful impetus to the expansion of the range of the burning problems which both powers have to solve in their own interests and in the interests of all other states and peoples. These are primarily the problems of disarmament and security. The conclusion of the treaty on the destruction of two classes of nuclear weapons and the appreciable progress toward the next agreement on a radical reduction in the main components of the nuclear confrontation under the conditions of strategic stability create the critical mass which is essential for a decisive breakthrough in the direction of a nuclear-free, secure world.

Also linked with the central problem of nuclear disarmament are other problems of world politics whose solution largely depends on progress in the arterial direction of removal of the military danger. At the same time, however, a search for the solution of contentious questions of considerable independent significance is essential. It was at this that intensive negotiations in Washington on a broad range of such specific problems of curbing the arms race as the limitation of and, ultimately, an end to nuclear testing; achievement of the

universality of the practice of nuclear nonproliferation; activation of a Soviet-American agreement on the creation in the capitals of the two states of nuclear risk reduction centers; the speediest conclusion of a verifiable all-embracing and effective international convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons; and a lowering of the level of the military confrontation in Europe in the sphere of armed forces and conventional arms and assistance to the speediest completion of the work in Vienna on the mandate of the negotiations on this problem in order that it might be possible for negotiations to start as soon as possible on the substance of the matter for the purpose of the formulation of specific measures. Both leaders discussed thoroughly and frankly the subject of human rights and humanitarian issues and also their place in the Soviet-American dialogue. Regional problems, including those concerning Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, the Near East, Cambodia, Southern Africa and Central America, were discussed in extensive and businesslike manner, and both the existence of the parties' serious differences of position and the need for the continuation of regular exchanges of opinions were ascertained.

The process of the extension of cooperation between the USSR and the United States in the solution of the central problem of world politics—that of the survival and secure development of human civilization—is gaining momentum. The accords which were arrived at afford a historic opportunity for making this process irreversible.

At the same time, however, there are no grounds for euphoria. The break with old views and archaic policy is inevitably increasing the resistance on the part of the forces which have linked themselves firmly with these attributes of confrontation. Having recovered from the first shock as the result of the Washington meeting, they have once again become active in the United States and other Western countries and are attempting to erect new barriers in the way of disarmament. They are demanding urgent measures for a buildup in West Europe of conventional and the modernization of the remaining nuclear power as compensation for the "loss" of the two classes of missiles. They are endeavoring to impede ratification of the treaty on their elimination. They are calling for an acceleration of the SDI program. They are urging the extensive manufacture of a new generation of chemical weapons. They are preventing a political settlement of regional conflicts. The danger of the sallies of the enemies of peace and cooperation is obvious, but something else is obvious also—their time is passing, and international development is yielding increasingly less to the pressure of militarism.

A vital interest in the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe and assured dependable security now unites all countries and all peoples. This is the root of the new philosophy of contemporary existence and the new political thinking addressed to mankind and his commonsense and prudence. Here is the deep-lying community of all processes of renewal and the irresistibility of their interaction in the name of peace and progress.

A powerful factor of the renewal of both our socialist society and international relations is perestroika in the Soviet Union. Its internal and external aspects are dual. They are equally addressed to man and intended to put to his benefit the entire potential of socialism—economic, social, political and spiritual—and to focus international affairs on preventing the destruction of the human race and securing the conditions for its peaceful life and prosperity.

Our perestroika within the country is lifting the settled layers of the period of stagnation which threatened to develop into a crisis, accelerating our economic and social development and bringing spiritual renewal. Our new foreign policy is helping lead international relations out of the labyrinths of fruitless and dangerous confrontation, take the heat out of explosive situations everywhere in the world, humanize states' relations and bring them into line with the high principles of morality and ethics.

Our perestroika within the country is inseparable from glasnost and democratization, socialist self-management, social self-awareness and responsibility and the all-around development of the personality. Our new foreign policy is contributing in every possible way to the development between all states and peoples of open, honest relations based on equality, respect for sovereignty and independence.

Our perestroika within the country is of a radical, revolutionary nature and signifies an abrupt change from extensive to intensive development and from outdated dogmas to realism of evaluations and actions. Our new foreign policy is oriented toward profound positive changes in the world situation and a transition from fettering fear and prejudice to trust and mutual understanding and from tense confrontation and dangerous instability to stable detente, dependable security and a nuclear-free, nonviolent world.

The new political thinking—in the Soviet Union, in the United States and throughout the world—is moving from the intellectual, conceptual sphere to the frontiers of practical, actual policy and activating powerful forces capable of directing world development into the channel of constructiveness and creativity. The significance of the new thinking and new policy common to all mankind is the guarantee that the future belongs to it.

#### Footnote

\* Oleg Nikolayevich Bykov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO, was in Washington at the time of the summit as a member of the group of experts and as a MEMO special correspondent.

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#### Soviet Asymmetrical Reductions in INF Treaty Hailed

18160006d Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 88 (signed to press 20 Jan 88) pp 21-34

[Article by V. Baranovskiy: "Commentary on the Treaty"]

[Text] On 8 December 1987 in Washington the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S. President authenticated by their signatures the "Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Their Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles." Intensive work on the wording thereof lasted literally until the final days preceding M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the United States. The treaty will take effect the day both its signatories exchange instruments of ratification. Structurally it consists of a brief introductory section and 17 articles. Three documents signed simultaneously with it are an inalienable part thereof. The longest of them is the Memorandum of Understanding on the determination of source data (1). It adduces information which the two sides exchanged on their existing intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. The Protocol on Procedures Regulating the Elimination of missile systems (2) determines the specific order and methods of the destruction of the missiles, launchers and support equipment and structures connected with them—in respect of each type of the arms which are the subject of the treaty. Finally, the Protocol on Inspection contains provisions drawn up by the parties for the purpose of ensuring the effectiveness of verification of compliance with the treaty.

#### I

Soviet and American intermediate- and shorter-range missiles are the subject of the treaty. Pertaining to the intermediate-range category are ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles (GLBM and GLCM) with a range of 1,000 to 5,500 km. And GLBM and GLCM with a range of 500-1,000 km are considered shorter-range missiles. Thus the treaty extends to ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a 500-5,500-km range (3).

It should be emphasized particularly that it is a question of both nuclear and nonnuclear missiles. Had the treaty contained a provision to the effect that it concerned nuclear systems of the corresponding range, all the measures for which it provided would not have applied to ballistic and cruise missiles in the event of their being fitted with warheads with conventional explosives or chemical war gas. The "conventionalization" and "chemicalization" of missile systems could reduce to nothing the results of the decision to eliminate existing nuclear intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. For this reason it is extremely important that the treaty applies to



ballistic and cruise missiles of the corresponding range which are a "weapon-delivery vehicle" (4) — weapons in general, and not only nuclear weapons.

The range permitting a missile's attribution to the intermediate- or shorter-range category is considered the maximum range at which at least one missile of the given type (for GLBM) has been tested or the maximum distance which it could cover in standard design mode until fuel exhaustion. (for GLCM) (5). If a launcher has ever contained a missile of a certain type or been used for the launch thereof, all such launchers are considered intended for the corresponding type of missiles (6). Each intermediate- and shorter-range missile is regarded as carrying the maximum number of warheads for the given type of missiles indicated in the Memorandum of Understanding (7).

At the same time, however, a distinction was between the missile systems which fall under the provisions of the treaty and the systems to which its restrictions do not extend. Among the latter are, specifically, GLBM developed and tested "solely for intercepting and countering objects not located on the surface of the Earth" (8) — ground-launched ABM interceptors, for example (although they are a "weapon-delivery system" and could in terms of their range pertain to the intermediate- and shorter-range category). Another similar reservation concerns ballistic and cruise missiles which are not intended for use in a ground-based mode but which may be tested from land-based fixed launchers. The latter are to be distinguishable here from land-based missile launchers and used solely for testing purposes. In this case tests will not automatically lead to the inclusion of the corresponding missile in the GLBM or GLCM category (9). Such a situation could arise, for example, at the time of test launches of sea-based cruise missiles from ground launchers. Finally, while having undertaken not to conduct flight tests of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (10), the parties reserved the right to carry out launches of booster systems (for putting facilities in the higher layers of the atmosphere and in space—probes, satellites and so forth) and resolved that, given compliance with certain restrictions, such launches would not be regarded as missile flight tests (11).

Such reservations and more exact definitions are undoubtedly an extra load on the treaty, but at the same time they reduce the possibility of this misunderstanding or the other arising in the process of its realization. Something else is of importance also: the restrictive and prohibitive provisions of the treaty are not to extend to the systems which for this reason or the other the subscribers do not consider it possible to include within the compass thereof.

At the same time the treaty also lists the specific types of missiles which fall within its scope. It is a question all told of 10 missile systems—6 Soviet, and 4 American. Eight of them are or have been part of the effective combat strength and are, in treaty terminology, "existing

types" of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (12). In addition, the USSR and the United States have one type of missile each which has been tested, but not deployed (13); they also are to be eliminated.

Among the intermediate-range missiles are:

1) The Soviet RSD-10 GLBM (14). They have been in service since 1976. They are fitted with a multiple reentry vehicle with three independently targetable warheads. They are launched from mobile launchers and have a range of 4,000 km. They are deployed in regiments consisting of two or three battalions (three per launcher). Thirty regiments (243 launchers) are deployed in the European part of the USSR, 18 regiments (162 launchers), in the Asian part.

2) The Soviet R-12 GLBM (15). Put in service in 1959. They are fitted with one nuclear warhead and have a range of 2,000 km. As of the latter half of the 1970s they have been replaced in connection with obsolescence and physical wear by the RSD-10. They are deployed only in the European part of the USSR.

3) The Soviet R-14 GLBM (16). Taken out of service owing to obsolescence and physical wear.

4) The Soviet RK-55 GLCM (17). Tests have been conducted; the launcher may hold up to six cruise missiles. Not deployed.

5) The American Pershing II GLBM. The decision to deploy them in West Europe was made by NATO in 1979 and came to be implemented as of 1983. Deployed at the present time in three areas on the territory of the FRG (115 launchers). They are launched from mobile launchers, have a range of 1,800 km and are fitted with reentry vehicle with a nuclear warhead with a yield of 5 to 50 kilotons.

6) The American BGM-109G GLCM (the Tomahawk). They have been deployed in West Europe as of the end of 1983 (in Great Britain, the FRG, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands). Range approximately 2,500 km, nuclear equipment, one warhead with a yield of 10 to 50 kilotons. Launched from traveling launchers (four missiles each).

Among the shorter-range missiles are:

1) The Soviet OTR-22 GLBM (18). Increased-range two-stage operational-tactical missiles (800-900 km) (19). Came to be deployed in 1984 on the territory of the GDR (54 missiles, 34 launchers) and the CSSR (39 missiles, 24 launchers) as a measure in retaliation for the start on the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in West Europe. Over 90 percent of the missiles and launchers deployed on USSR territory are in the Asian part of the country.



2) The Soviet OTR-23 GLBM (20). Range, 500 km (21). Almost one-third of the deployed missiles of this type are located in the GDR.

3) The American Pershing IA GLBM. Mobile two-stage missiles with a range of 740 km and fitted with a reentry vehicle with a nuclear warhead with a yield of 60 to 400 kilotons. They have been deployed in U.S. Army units on FRG territory (as of 1964, Pershing I missiles; replaced in 1970 by the Pershing IA). They were replaced in 1983-1985 by the Pershing II intermediate-range missile, and for this reason the United States has no missiles of the given type deployed at the present time. The effective strength of the FRG Air Force includes 72 Pershing IA missiles (which, however, are not affected by the treaty).

4) The American Pershing IB GLBM. They represent a single-stage modification of the Pershing II missile. They have been tested, but have not been deployed and are not being manufactured.

A most difficult problem which arose in the course of preparation of the treaty was connected with the particular features of the manufacture of two-stage GLBM in the USSR and the United States. The Soviet RSD-10 leave the plant fully assembled and "packed" in the launch canister. The American Pershings are manufactured and frequently also stored at warehouses and transported in the form of separate stages, whose assembly requires no special conditions and may be undertaken in practically location. Understandably, were only whole missiles to be counted, this would remove from the treaty's effective compass a large number of missiles which are stored and shipped in separate stages, but which may be assembled easily and rapidly if necessary.

At the same time, however, natural questions arose also in connection with missiles manufactured in canisters: how to distinguish the latter from empty canisters and how to preclude the possibility of their use to conceal intermediate-range missiles.

These questions were settled as follows. It was decided that if missiles may be stored or transported in the form of separate stages, the longest stage will be counted as a whole missile (22). And any missile canister will be counted in the same way—if the other side has not been furnished with convincing proof that it does not contain a missile (23). It was decided to count the GLCM airframe as an entire missile also (24).

The data adduced in the Memorandum of Understanding on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and also on the launchers of such missiles are presented in unitized form in Table 1. They reflect the state of affairs on 1 November 1987 and may have undergone certain changes by the time the treaty comes into force. In addition, each party declared that it was responsible for

the soundness of its data only. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to compose a preliminary idea of the scale of the measures envisaged by the treaty.

It is contemplated eliminating altogether 899 deployed and 700 nondeployed intermediate-range missiles and also 698 deployed and 198 nondeployed launchers of such missiles. For the intermediate-range missile class this will constitute in toto almost 1,600 missiles and approximately 900 launchers.

Some 1,096 shorter-range missiles (387 of which deployed) and also 238 of their launchers will be destroyed also. Altogether, thus, by the time of the completion of the process of elimination of the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles the missile arsenals of the USSR and the United States will have diminished by almost 2,700, and missiles deployed at operating facilities constitute half this quantity (approximately 1,300), what is more.

The USSR and the United States will remove an approximately identical number of deployed intermediate-range missiles (470 and 429 respectively), and in respect of the European region, what is more, 40 percent more American intermediate-range missiles than Soviet will be destroyed (429 and 308). But because of the USSR's excess in terms of existing nondeployed intermediate-range missiles it will eliminate altogether one-third more missiles of this class than the United States (910 and 170), which reflects the manifestly hypertrophied development of this class of arms, which contrasts particularly strikingly with the complete absence of deployed shorter-range missiles on the part of the United States. It is owing to these disproportions that the overall balance of the reductions planned by the treaty appears "more favorable" to the United States, compared with which we have as a whole to eliminate over twice as many missiles (859 and 1,836) and three times as many launchers (283 and 851).

All these arithmetical computations are useful for evaluating the balance of forces in the sphere of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles which actually exists. However, the possible impression gained on the basis thereof of "one-sided advantages" derived from the treaty by one party is purely superficial and connected with the traditional (and frequently stalemated) approach, which is oriented not toward the end result but the simplistically understood principle of "reciprocity" in the reductions to be made.

First, some figures could be confusing if we fail to see what lies behind them. The Soviet Union, for example, has to destroy over twice as many intermediate-range missile launchers as the United States (614 and 282). However, it evidently needs to be considered here that each GLCM launcher is intended not for one but four (BGM-109G) or six (RK-55) cruise missiles. And the Soviet Union, moreover, has only six such launchers, but for the United States they constitute almost half the total

Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles of the USSR and the United States.  
Soviet and American Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missile Launchers

Таблица 1

РАКЕТЫ СРЕДНЕЙ И МЕНЬШЕЙ ДАЛЬНОСТИ СССР И США.  
ПУСКОВЫЕ УСТАНОВКИ СОВЕТСКИХ И АМЕРИКАНСКИХ РСД — РМД

	СССР (1)						США (2)					
	Ракеты средней дальности (3)			Ракеты меньшей дальности (4)			Ракеты средней дальности (5)			Ракеты меньшей дальности (6)		
	(7) РСД-10	(8) R-12	(9) R-14	(10) RK-55	(11) P-12	(12) P-14	(13) P-16	(14) P-18	(15) P-20	(16) P-22	(17) P-24	(18) P-26
Развернутые ракеты (21) . . . . .	405	65	—	—	470	220	167	387	120	309	429	—
Неразвернутые ракеты (22) . . . . .	945	105	6	84	440	506	33	530	127	133	260	170
Суммарное количество развернутых и неразвернутых ракет . . . . . (23)	650	170	6	84	910	726	200	926	247	442	689	170
Развернутые ПУ (24) . . . . .	405	79	—	—	484	115	82	197	115	109	105	—
Неразвернутые ПУ (25) . . . . .	118	6	—	6	130	20	26	40	52	17	51	—
Суммарное количество развернутых и неразвернутых ПУ (26)	523	85	—	6	614	135	108	237	167	126	156	—

Источники: Составлено по Меморандуму о договоренности: раздел II, пп. 1, 2; раздел III, пп. 1 (а, б); 2 (а, б); раздел IV, пп. 1 (а, б); 2 (а, б); раздел V (а, б).

Key: 1. USSR — 2. United States — 3. Intermediate-range missiles — 4. Shorter-range missiles — 5. Intermediate-range missiles — 6. Shorter-range missiles — 7. RSD-10 — 8. R-12 — 9. R-14 — 10. RK-55 — 11. Intermediate-range missiles, total — 12. OTR-22 — 13. OTR-23 — 14. Shorter-range missiles, total — 15. Pershing II — 16. BGM-109G — 17. Intermediate-range missiles, total — 18. Pershing IA — 19. Pershing IB — 20. Shorter-range missiles, total — 21. Deployed missiles — 22. Nondeployed missiles — 23. Aggregate number of deployed and nondeployed missiles — 24. Deployed launchers — 25. Nondeployed launchers — 26. Aggregate number of deployed and nondeployed launchers

Source: Compiled from Memorandum of Understanding: Section II, clauses 1, 2; Section III, clauses 1 (a, b); 2(a, b); Section IV, clauses 1 (a, b), 2 (a, b); Section V (a, b).

existing number thereof. If the corresponding calculations are made, it is not difficult to see that the United States will have to eliminate launchers capable of carrying 660 intermediate-range missiles, the Soviet Union, 644.

Second, movement toward a zero level in respect of any class of arms means that the party which has superiority therein will have to eliminate a larger quantity of the corresponding systems.

Third and finally, an ability to use only the four arithmetical operations in questions of safeguarding national and international security and moving toward disarmament is insufficient—it is essential to resort also, where necessary, to more complex formulas also. Those taking into consideration, for example, not only asymmetrical reductions "beneficial" to the United States but also the objective geostrategic asymmetry—it is this which makes the elimination of intermediate-range missiles far more important for the Soviet Union, which is within the range of American Pershings and Tomahawks, than for the United States, which analogous Soviet systems do not reach.

Indeed, a readiness and capacity for renouncing surpluses in the military sphere for the sake of safeguarding one's own and general security may altogether under modern conditions be regarded not only as a manifestation of political wisdom but as a sign of a state's confidence of its strength enabling it agree to deep cuts in troops and arms for the sake of achieving priority policy goals. The most important of them is ensuring the country's security, which is to an increasingly great extent becoming a political and not only military task.

## II

The treaty's provisions will be realized in parallel in several areas.

The parties undertake upon the treaty taking effect not to manufacture any intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, stages of such missiles and their launchers. In respect of shorter-range missiles a ban is imposed on missile launches also (25).

In the course of the negotiations big difficulties were associated with the fact that the first stage of the Soviet RS-12M ICBM (that is, not within the compass of the treaty) is outwardly greatly similar to the first stage of the RSD-10, which is to be eliminated (26). In respect of the United States a similar situation will arise if the administration decides to embark on the production of the Pershing IC tactical missile—to which the treaty does not extend also (inasmuch as its range is less than 500 km), but which has a stage outwardly similar to the second stage of the Pershing II intermediate-range missile.

The American side originally insisted on a maximalist approach: the complete prohibition of the manufacture of all stages outwardly similar to those used in intermediate-range missiles. Soviet representatives objected entirely reasonably that for the USSR the restrictions would thereby extend not only to intermediate- and shorter-range missiles but also ICBM's—it would in fact have to abandon the manufacture of the said type of missiles, and essentially do this unilaterally, what is more.

The compromise reached between the USSR and the United States provides for the parties' preservation of the right to manufacture the stages indicated above. The sole condition being that no other stages outwardly similar to any other stage of the RSD-10 and Pershing II missiles must be produced (27). The possibility of the secret preparation for assembly of missiles whose manufacture will be prohibited by the treaty should thereby be precluded in principle.

Within 30 days after the treaty has come into force the parties will update the data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding (28). It is a question not only of the figures adduced above on the quantity of missiles and launchers (and also the support structures and equipment associated with them) but also of a list (with an indication of the precise geographical location) of the deployment areas (29), missile operating bases (30) and missile support facilities (31). Subsequently this updated data will be exchanged every 6 months.

As of the time the treaty comes into force the parties undertake not to increase the quantity and not change the location of the deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities (aside from the elimination facilities) (32). Missiles will not be located at training facilities, and missiles and launchers will not be located at manufacturing facilities and test ranges (on the expiration of 30 days after the treaty has come into force) (33).

The treaty determines the shortest elimination timeframe for the two types of missiles which have been tested, but not deployed—the Soviet Union's RK-55 and the United States' Pershing IB. The destruction of these missiles and also their launchers is envisaged within a period of 6 months after the treaty has come into force (34).

It is planned to eliminate the shorter-range missiles and the corresponding launchers (together with the support equipment) within 18 months (35). The removal of deployed shorter-range missiles and also all launchers for such missiles to the elimination facilities (this means, specifically, the withdrawal of the Soviet OTR-22 and the OTR-23 from the territory of the GDR and the CSSR) will have been completed 90 days after the treaty has come into force; it is necessary to have transferred



thither all nondeployed missiles also within 12 months (36). It is stipulated that the shorter-range missile and its launcher elimination facilities be no less than 1,000 km apart (37).

As far as the intermediate-range missiles are concerned, they will be eliminated (together with their launchers and support structures and equipment) within a 3-year period (38).

There was a long argument at the negotiations between Soviet and American representatives about whether both parties should embark upon this elimination at once and effect it on an equal-percentage basis or whether it was first necessary to make the existing levels identical (which required unilateral reductions on the part of the USSR). A solution was found in the determination of a two-stage timetable for the elimination of this class of weapons. The length of the first stage was put at almost 2 years 6 months (29 months); at the end thereof the number of each party's existing missiles and launchers must not be in excess of the ceilings stipulated in the treaty (39). These ceilings were determined indirectly—via the maximum number of warheads (171) on missiles for which the deployed launchers are designated; via the maximum number of warheads (180) on deployed missiles; via the maximum number warheads (200) on deployed and nondeployed missiles, as, equally, on missiles for which deployed and nondeployed launchers are designated; via a nonincrease in the proportion of ballistic missiles in the sum total of deployed and nondeployed intermediate-range missiles (40).

The way in which the USSR and the United States will be able to "select" these ceilings is shown in Table 2. Some of the indicators incorporated therein vary depending on the proportion between RSD-10 and R-12 missiles (with a different quantity of warheads—3 and 1) and also between the Pershing II and BGM-109G missiles (with different launchers—for 1 and for 4 missiles). It is not difficult to calculate that by the end of the first stage the sum total of deployed intermediate-range missile launchers will have been reduced for the USSR and the United States (together) by 70-86 percent, of the missiles of this class themselves, by 76-80 percent, of deployed and nondeployed launchers, by 76-87 percent, and of deployed and nondeployed intermediate-range missiles, by 79-83 percent. The remaining missiles and launchers are to be eliminated during the second stage lasting 7 months (that is, no later than 3 years after the treaty has come into force) (41).

There is agreement between the parties to the treaty that the destruction of all intermediate- and shorter-range missiles has to have been completed 15 days prior to the end of the overall elimination period. In the final 15 days the question of American nuclear warheads for the West German Pershing IA missiles will be decided: these warheads "will by unilateral decision be released from existing cooperation programs," removed to the confines

of national territory and eliminated in accordance with the procedures envisaged for the other analogous components of the missile systems (42).

Facilities designated by the parties are earmarked for the elimination of the missile systems; the USSR has eight, the United States will have two (the American side has not named them as yet).

The Protocol on Elimination determines the components of the missile systems to be eliminated. Aside from the missile itself, they are also:

the launch canister (for the RSD-10, RK-55 and BGM-109G);

the launcher (for all missiles aside from the R-12, R-14 and Pershing IB);

missile transporter vehicles (aside from those for the R-14, RK-55 and all American missiles);

fixed structures for launchers (for the RSD-10);

the launch pad shelter (for the Pershing II);

the missile erector, launch stand and propellant tank (for the R-12) (43).

All stages of intermediate- and shorter-range GLBM and also all training missiles, stages of training missiles, training launch canisters and training launchers are to be eliminated (44). It is stipulated specially that all reentry vehicles of deployed intermediate- and shorter-range missiles are to be eliminated (45); the nuclear warhead device and guidance elements may be removed from them here (46).

Methods of the destruction of all components of the missile systems in respect of each type of intermediate- and shorter-range missile were elaborated. The missile itself, for example, will be eliminated by way of explosive demolition or by way of burning its stages; the nozzle of the propulsion system (for certain types of missiles) will be cut away; the airframe of cruise missiles will be cut lengthwise, and the wings and tail section will be cut from the airframe; the front section and launch canister will be detached or flattened under a press; the main components of the launcher will be cut away from the chassis and severed in places which are not assembly joints and so forth (47).

The elimination of a certain number of intermediate-range missiles by the launching method is authorized—not more than 100 in the first 6 months after the treaty has come into force (48). The said limitation was imposed from considerations of an ecological nature. Destruction by the launching method naturally provides for the removal of the nuclear warhead from the front section; however, the guidance elements in the missile



Anticipated Results of the Reduction in Soviet and American Intermediate-Range Missiles by the End of Stage I  
ОЖИДАЕМЫЕ РЕЗУЛЬТАТЫ СОКРАЩЕНИЯ СОВЕТСКИХ  
И АМЕРИКАНСКИХ РСД К КОНЦУ I ЭТАПА

	(1) СССР		(2) США	
	(3) Кол-во	(4) % сокращения	Кол-во	% сокращения
Развернутые ПУ: — на 1.XI.1987 г. (5)	484	80—88	214	56—81
к концу I этапа (6)	57—100		42—95	
Развернутые РСД: — на 1.XI.1987 г. (7)	470	78—86	429	58
к концу I этапа (8)	65—103		180	
Развернутые и неразвернутые ПУ (в сумме): — на 1.XI.1987 г. (9)	614	82—89	282	64—82
к концу I этапа (10)	66—110		50—102	
Развернутые и неразвернутые РСД (в сумме): — на 1.XI.1987 г. (11)	910	88—93	689	71
к концу I этапа (12)	66—110		200	

Источник: составлено по Меморандуму о договоренности, раздел II—V;  
статья IV, п. 2 (а).

Key: 1. USSR — 2. United States — 3. Number — 4. Percentage reduction — 5. Deployed launchers on 1 November 1987 — 6. By the end of stage I — 7. Deployed intermediate-range missiles on 1 November 1987 — 8. By the end of stage I — 9. Deployed and nondeployed launchers (aggregate) on 1 November 1987 — 10. By the end of stage I — 11. Deployed and nondeployed intermediate-range missiles (aggregate) on 1 November 1987 — 12. By the end of stage I

Source: compiled from Memorandum of Understanding, sections II-V; article IV, clause 2 (a).

are to be destroyed together with it. The missiles eliminated in this way are to be launched singly and with an interval of no less than 6 hours; using the intermediate-range missiles to be destroyed by the launching method as a target vehicle for ballistic missile interceptors is prohibited (49).

For the elimination of the fixed support structure its superstructure, which is removed from its mount or foundation, is dismantled or destroyed; the mount or

foundation are, in turn, destroyed by way of extraction from the ground or with the aid of an explosive (50). The R-12 propellant tanks will simply be removed from the launch sites and, consequently, may subsequently be used in the economy. The question of mobile launchers and missile transporter vehicles (tow trucks) was also decided with regard for the possibility of such use: they will not be destroyed but will merely be subject to certain procedures which prevent them performing their original military functions. For example, on the transporter vehicle for the RSD-10 all missile loading and mounting

mechanisms will be removed from the chassis and cut in two; all the mountings of such mechanisms will be cut off; the instrument compartments will be removed; the leveling supports will be cut off and cut in two; a part of the chassis behind the rear axle (not more than 0.78 meters long) will be cut off (51). As a result this tow truck will no longer be in a position to transport the said missile—it may be used effectively, however, to haul, for example, large-diameter pipes.

Finally, a further two situations where this missile system component or the other is considered eliminated are envisaged. First, if they are destroyed or lost as the result of an accident, of which the other side will be notified accordingly (52). Second, a certain quantity of operating or training missiles, launch canisters and launchers (up to 15 per each of the three components) may be placed on static display (in a museum, for example), on condition that they are made unfit for combat use. In this case they also will be deemed eliminated following compliance with certain formalities (53).

The treaty determines the criteria according to which the deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility may be deemed eliminated. It is essential to remove therefrom all intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, launchers and support equipment, destroy all the support structures located there and cease all activity associated with the production, flight testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles or launchers (54). At the same time, however, the conversion of a missile operating base for cruise and ballistic missiles not within the scope of the treaty is permitted; the condition is merely timely notification of the opposite side of the date and purposes of this conversion (55). This means that the United States, for example, may convert its Pershing II and BGM-109G bases in West Germany to bases for tactical missiles; the Soviet Union, in turn, has the right to reorient intermediate-range missile operating bases toward ICBM bases. It would seem that the financial and economic "expediency" of such a decision would be exceeded by the obvious political costs inasmuch as there would be, instead of disarmament, merely the direction of military preparations into a new channel (in this specific instance at least).

### III

The treaty provides for a broad set of measures designed to ensure the parties' mutual confidence in compliance with its provisions. In terms of the scale and depth of these measures the treaty is unparalleled and may be regarded as a fundamentally new phenomenon in the arms limitation and disarmament sphere.

The said measures are divided in practice into two large groups—notification and inspection.

The main purpose of notification is to make available to the opposite side information on changes which have taken place or which are planned in the sphere encompassed by the treaty. In addition to the above-mentioned granting of information contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and updated regularly by the parties (within 30 days following the expiration of each 6-month period), notification is provided for in the following instances:

- 1) at the time of the scheduled elimination of a specific deployment area, specific operating base or missile support facility (no less than 30 days) (56);
- 2) at the time of scheduled changes in the number or location of the elimination facilities (no less than 30 days) (57);
- 3) at the time of the scheduled elimination of missiles, stages, launchers and support structures and equipment (no less than 30 days) (58);
- 4) at the time of the scheduled destruction of intermediate-range missiles by the launching method (no less than 10 days) (59);
- 5) when changes have taken place in the number of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, launchers and support structures and equipment (no later than 48 hours) (60);
- 6) at the time of movement of operating and training missiles and launchers and their transit (no later than 48 hours after its completion) (61);
- 7) at the time of the planned launch of a booster system for R&D purposes (no less than 10 days) (62);
- 8) at the time of the planned conversion of a missile operating base for GLBM and GLCM not within the scope of the treaty (no less than 30 days) (63);
- 9) at the time of the planned elimination of training missiles, training launchers or training launch canisters (no less than 30 days) (64);
- 10) at the time of the planned placement on static display of operating or training missiles, launch canisters or launchers (65);
- 11) upon the intention to carry out an inspection (16 or 72 hours depending on the type of inspection) (66).

The exchange of updated source data and the granting of information required by the treaty will be effected via the nuclear risk reduction centers, which will be set up in accordance with the 15 September 1987 agreement between the USSR and the United States (67).

As far as on-site inspections are concerned, six different types thereof are envisaged.

- 1) **Inspections to verify source data.** (68) They may begin within 30 and must be completed within no more than 90 days after the treaty has come into force. Their purpose is to verify the number of missiles, launchers,

support structures and equipment and other information announced by the other side. The inspections may be carried out at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities indicated in the Memorandum of Understanding (69).

2) **Inspections for verifying the elimination of missile operating bases and missile support facilities** (except the missile-manufacturing plants) (70). Such inspections will be made within a 60-day period following the scheduled date of the elimination (of which, as indicated above, the appropriate notification is to have been given).

3) **Inspections on a quota basis** (71). They may begin within 90 days and be conducted for 13 years after the treaty has come into force at all existing or former (eliminated) missile operating bases and missile support facilities indicated in the Memorandum of Understanding (with the exception of the missile-manufacturing plants and the elimination facilities). Within the first 3 years each party has the right to conduct 20 such inspections a year, within the next 5 years, 15, and within the final 5 years, 10. Altogether the USSR and the United States may thus conduct 185 quota inspections each.

4) **Inspections at the elimination facilities** for intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the launchers of such missiles and support equipment (72). The specific feature thereof is that the destruction of all the said components of the missile systems has to be carried out only in the presence of inspectors of the other side, which must obligatorily be sent the appropriate notification. The said specific feature is also reflected in the terminology of the treaty: the parties "have the right to conduct" all the other types of inspection, whereas inspection at the elimination facilities they will simply "conduct."

5) **Inspections to confirm the fact of completion of the elimination process** (73). The reference is to the above-mentioned "supplementary" methods of elimination—as the result of an accident or in connection with the transfer of certain components of missile systems to a static display (74). A 60-day period from the time the appropriate notification is received is determined in the latter instance (75). Inspections for the purpose of confirming the fact of the elimination of training missiles, stages, launch canisters and launchers pertain to this category (76).

6) **Inspections of the nonproduction of missiles at the manufacturing plants** (77). These are an entirely special type of inspections distinguished from all the above. The inspections will be made continuously for 13 years at the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant (Udmurt ASSR) and at the Hercules Plant Number 1 at Magna (Utah).

The Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant has been declared by the Soviet Union the facility manufacturing the RSD-10, OTR-22 and OTR-23 (78). There are no other plants in the USSR manufacturing intermediate- and

shorter-range missiles. The Hercules Plant Number 1 at Magna has been declared by the American side the facility manufacturing Pershing II missiles (79). However, besides this, the United States included in the Memorandum of Understanding a further three missile-manufacturing facilities, two of which for the BGM-109G missiles (the McDonnell-Douglas plant in Titusville, Florida and the General Dynamics plant in [Kerni-Mesa], California) (80) and one for Pershing IA missiles (the Longhorn U.S. Army Munitions Plant in Marshall, Texas) (81). There will be no inspections at these three plants—neither continuous nor quota; it is planned monitoring them with the aid of national technical means of verification.

Is there reason to consider this evidence of the unequal status of the parties to the treaty? The fact that the corresponding treaty article, to judge by its content, is aimed not so much at the inspecting of missile-manufacturing facilities as at preventing this misunderstanding or the other in connection with the above-mentioned problem of manufacture of the first stage for the RS-12M ICBM, which is outwardly similar to the first stage of the RSD-10 missile, may serve to explain, evidently. It was for this reason that the American side insisted on inspecting the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant inasmuch as without on-site verification convincing oneself that the stages manufactured are intended for ICBM's and not for intermediate-range missiles is impossible. In the United States, as mentioned above, such clashes could arise only if the Pershing IC tactical missile comes to be manufactured. As yet, however, the right accorded the Soviet Union to inspect the plant in Utah has been governed not so much by the logic of the treaty article in question as the need to "balance" the American side's inspection powers in respect of the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant.

This conclusion is indirectly confirmed also by the inclusion in the article of the provision that if, as of the third year after the treaty has come into force, the process of the assembly of missiles using "outwardly similar" stages is not realized for 12 months in succession, both parties will lose the right to the continuous inspection of whichever missile-manufacturing facility. In other words, if the manufacture of the RS-12M missile (using a stage outwardly similar to that of the RSD-10 missile) ceases, the continuous inspecting of the two said enterprises will cease also.

Continuous verification is not imposed at the facilities manufacturing intermediate-range GLBM and GLCM launchers—the "Barrikady" Plant in Volgograd (82), the Heavy Machine-Building Plant imeni V.I. Lenin in Petropavlovsk (83) and the Experimental Plant of the "Mashinostroitelnyy zavod im. M.I. Kalinin" Production Association in Sverdlovsk (84) and the Martin-Marietta plant in Middle River (Maryland) and Air Force Plant Number 19 in San Diego (California) (86). However, inspections carried out on a quota basis will extend to them.



Owing to the outward similarity of the stages of the RS-12M and RSD-10, a decision was adopted on the possibility of the organization of one further type of monitoring (until a treaty on a reduction in strategic offensive arms comes into force, but, in any event, for no more than 3 years from the time the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles comes into force). It is a question of assisting observation by national technical means of verification for the purpose of allowing the opposite side to convince itself that the treaty is not being violated. For this—in the event of an inquiry concerning the corresponding ICBM operating base being received—it is necessary within no more than 6 hours to open the roofs of all the launcher fixed structures located there and display the missiles in the open without the use of concealment measures and leave them in this position for 12 hours from the time the inquiry was received (87). It is believed that the inquiring party will be able with the aid of satellites to convince itself of the deployment at this base precisely of ICBM's and not intermediate-range missiles. Such inquiries concerning implementation of the measures based on cooperation may be forwarded six times per calendar year.

The Protocol on Inspection contains rules drawn up in detail of the implementation of the various types of verification envisaged by the treaty. The day after it has come into force the parties will exchange three lists containing the 200 names of the inspectors for continuous monitoring of the manufacturer-plants, the inspectors for all the other types of inspections and the members of the aircrews (inasmuch as the inspecting country uses its own aircraft for sending inspectors to the country in which the monitoring will take place) (88).

They are all, in accordance with a special annex, granted diplomatic privileges and immunity. Visas and papers for unimpeded residence in the country being inspected will be issued for a term of no less than 24 months (89).

The inspections will be organized such that they might ensure that all the necessary information be obtained as quickly as possible. Special points of entry for the inspectors have been designated (Moscow and Irkutsk in the Soviet Union, Washington and San Francisco in the United States) (90). Short notification times making it possible to ensure the practically total surprise of the inspection inquiry have been determined (91). Rules governing the importation into the inspected country of the necessary equipment and materials and the procedure of their use have been determined (92).

It will not be possible in this article to study all the features of the inspection mechanism but a certain idea thereof at least (in the sense of a comparison of the different types of inspections) may be provided by Table 3. We would mention, besides, a number of fundamental points.

Inspections are envisaged not only in the USSR and the United States but also on the territory of the states allied to them on which missile operating bases and missile support facilities are located. Inasmuch as they are included in the Memorandum of Understanding, there is every reason to pose the question of inspections thereof. Special agreements will be concluded for this purpose—by the Soviet Union with the GDR and the CSSR, and by the United States with the FRG, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. It is envisaged also that the USSR will exchange the corresponding notes with the five said West European countries, and the United States, with the GDR and the CSSR. There are on the territory of these states, which are not party to the treaty, 19 facilities at which inspections may be conducted (which constitutes over 10 percent of their total number). This essentially makes the said states indirect subscribers to the treaty. The Protocol on Inspection, for example, determines the points of entry for the inspectors not only in the USSR and the United States but also in all the above-listed countries allied to them (93).

The party being inspected assumes full support for the inspection group (meals, residential and work premises, transport and, if necessary, medical assistance). However, all expenditure on the exercise of continuous inspection of a missile-production facility (including meals, service, accommodations, transport and so forth) is, on the contrary, borne by the inspecting party (94). And this will undoubtedly be a substantial part of the financial burden of the inspections inasmuch as the inspecting party is accorded the opportunity of constructing four buildings with an area of up to 650 square meters (for a data-collection center, headquarters of the inspection group and for the storage of material and equipment); establishing monitoring facilities at the plant exits (weight sensors and so forth); locating at the main portal equipment for measuring the length and diameter of missile stages and for obtaining a non-damaging image of the contents of the launch canisters and shipping containers; establishing main and backup power sources; and so forth (95).

The inspectors have in fact been accorded all the rights necessary to convince themselves of nonviolation of the treaty. It was necessary in some instances for the sake of this to provide for the possibility of actions even which are completely at odds with the traditional ideas of the necessary level of secrecy in such a sensitive field as military production. Thus, for example, if a transport vehicle leaving the portal of an inspected missile-production facility carries a canister containing a missile (or stage) equal or superior in terms of size to the corresponding intermediate-range missile (or stage thereof), the inspecting party has the right to inspect the contents of this canister eight times in a calendar year (96). To be more specific and deal once more with a problem which has been mentioned repeatedly, the canisters containing the RS-12M missiles or the first stage thereof transported from the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant may be opened up once every six weeks on average at the demand of the American inspectors for them to convince

Inspections Provided for by the Soviet-American INF Treaty

Таблица 3

ИНСПЕКЦИИ, ПРЕДУСМАТРИВАЕМЫЕ СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКИМ ДОГОВОРОМ ПО РСД — РМД

Вид инспекции (1)	Договорное основание (2)	Количество инспекционных объектов (для СССР и США) (3)	Возможное начало проведения инспекции (4)	Минимальный срок уведомления об инспекции (5)	Максимальная продолжительность инспекции (5)	Завершение инспекции (7)	Состав инспекции (8)	Максимальный состав инспекционной группы (9)
По проверке исходных данных (10)	Ст. XI п. 3 (11)	~130; ~30	Через 30 дней <sup>1</sup> (12)	16 часов (13)	24 часа <sup>2</sup> (14)	Через 90 дней <sup>1</sup> (15)	200 человек (24)	10 человек (16)
П. контроль за ликвидацией ракетных объектов без истребительных объектов (17)	Ст. XI п. 4 (18)	~130; ~30		16 часов (16)	24 часа <sup>2</sup> (17)	В течение 60 дней после объявления даты ликвидации (19)		10 человек (18)
На объектах осколов (20)	Ст. XI п. 5 (21)	~130; ~30	Через 90 дней <sup>1</sup> (22)	16 часов (23)	24 часа <sup>2</sup> (24)	Через 13 лет <sup>1</sup> (25)	200 человек (26)	10 человек (27)
В местах ликвидации (25)	Ст. XI п. 7 (26)	8; 3		72 часа (27)		Через 3 года <sup>1</sup> (28)		20 человек (29)
По подтверждению факта ликвидации (29)	Ст. XI п. 8 (30)			72 часа (31)		По согласованию или в 60-дневный срок с момента уведомления (32)		20 человек (33)
На объектах по производству ракет (33)	Ст. XI п. 6 (34)	1; 1	Через 30 дней <sup>1</sup> (35)	Постоянное инспектирование (36)		Через 13 лет <sup>1</sup> (37)	200 человек (38)	30 человек (39)

После вступления Договора в силу.  
С возможным продлением на срок не более 8 часов.

Источник: составлено по Протоколу об инспекциях и статье XI, пп. 3-8.

Key: 1. Type of inspection — 2. Treaty basis — 3. Number of facilities to be inspected — 4. Possible start of inspections — 5. Minimum inspection notification time — 6. Maximum duration of inspection — 7. Completion of inspections — 8. Scheduled inspectors — 9. Maximum composition of inspection team — 10. To verify source data — 11. Article XI, clause 3 — 12. 30 days — 13. 16 hours — 14. 24 hours — 15. Within 90 days — 16. 10 persons — 17. To verify the elimination of missile operating bases and support facilities — 18. Article XI, clause 4 — 19. Within 60 days following the announced date of elimination — 20. On a quota basis — 21. Article XI, clause 5 — 22. 90 days — 23. Within 13 years — 24. 200 persons — 25. At elimination facilities — 26. Article XI, clause 7 — 27. 72 hours — 28. Within 3 years — 29. To confirm the fact of elimination — 30. Article XI, clause 8 — 31. 72 hours — 32. By arrangement or within 60 days from the time of notification — 33. At missile-production facilities — 34. Article XI, clause 6 — 35. 30 days — 36. Continuous inspecting — 37. Within 13 years

<sup>1</sup> After the treaty has come into force.

<sup>2</sup> With a possible extension for a period of no more than 8 hours.

themselves that RSD-10 missiles or their first stages, which are to be eliminated, are not being transported in them. Such procedures may with every justification be considered unprecedented.

At the same time it needs to be noted that the treaty inspections are of a broad, but not unlimited nature. The American side had to abandon its original demand according to which "inspections on suspicion" could be conducted at any facilities without exception. In this case, as the Soviet representatives at the negotiations emphasized, an opportunity would be afforded for utterly absurd demands concerning inspections at facilities known to be totally unconnected with the production or keep of the corresponding missiles. The treaty describes perfectly precisely and specifically the range of facilities open to inspection—they are those facilities and only those facilities included in the Memorandum of Understanding.

One further "imbalance" between the USSR and the United States caused by the treaty—in respect of the number of inspections possible for each side—is also understandable in this connection. According to the information adduced in the press, the USSR may in the 13 years conduct approximately 240 inspections on the territory of the United States and West European countries, whereas the United States has the right to approximately 400 inspections on the territory of the Soviet Union, the GDR and the CSSR (97). This asymmetry is explained just as simply as those already dealt with above: we have approximately four times as many facilities connected with intermediate- and shorter-range missiles at which a variety of inspections may be conducted (see Table 4). And here also what is important is not "mutual equality," which would testify to a dissimilar scale of monitoring for the two countries, but the conviction of each of them that the forms and procedures of inspection which have been elaborated permit the effective verification of compliance with the treaty.

The fact that the Soviet Union put the political priorities of security at the forefront made possible the successful solution of the question of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. And, furthermore, this safeguards our security far more reliably than all the hundreds and hundreds of missiles which will be scrapped.

Skeptics point to the fact that the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States will be reduced as a result of implementation of the treaty only 4 percent. But this nuclear weapons system or the other should be evaluated not only in terms of the absolute indicators of its power of destruction. Even more important is how dangerous it is from the viewpoint of the possibilities of the outbreak of nuclear war. It is a question of highly accurate, but at the same time highly vulnerable missiles, the majority of which has a short flight time. And systems with such specifications are objectively adapted primarily toward first use.

In this sense the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles to be eliminated are far more substantial than the 4 percent for which they account. After all, an atom bomb may be rendered unoperational by the removal therefrom of an ordinary explosive, although it accounts for a microscopically small part of this system's destructive power. Granted all the conditionality of such an analogy, it would nonetheless seem perfectly appropriate in this instance.

The systems to be eliminated are at the intersection, as it were, of noncoincident strategic views on nature, scale and consequences of their combat use. The United States sees intermediate-range missiles as theater weapons and weapons for fighting a limited war in Europe; for a global nuclear clash they are simply unnecessary inasmuch as they are not comparable with strategic offensive arms. But the USSR cannot fail to see the American intermediate-range missiles as representing a strategic threat to it since their use is planned against Soviet territory and would have catastrophic consequences for the most populated and developed parts of the country. This objective political and strategic asymmetry makes extraordinarily more difficult the search for mutually acceptable solutions connected with the military support for security. It is extremely important, therefore, that an opportunity is now arising for the removal from the most complex mechanism of East-West military confrontation precisely the part thereof which is the material embodiment of the said asymmetry in the systems of weapons and operational plans of their use.

And in this sense the Soviet-American INF Treaty is a significant event not only for relations between the two most important powers of the present day. It has become, as is clear even now, a most important landmark in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament. The destruction of two entire classes of nuclear weapons, not obsolete, in the main, what is more, but modern and highly effective means of warfare; the possibility of asymmetrical reductions as a result of the readiness of the party which had moved ahead to abide not by military but political imperatives of ensuring security; the broad-scale and in-depth system of verification of compliance with the accords which have been achieved leading to the minimum of mutual fears and suspicions—such are the practical results of the new political thinking in this sphere of relations between states.

#### Footnotes

1. Henceforward Memorandum of Understanding.
2. Henceforward Protocol on Elimination.
3. Long-range missile systems are the subject of the Soviet-American negotiations on strategic offensive arms. Negotiations are not yet being conducted on missiles with a range of less than 500 km.
4. Article II, clauses 1, 2.



Number of Missile Operating Bases and Missile Support Facilities (According to the Memorandum of Understanding)

Таблица 4

КОЛИЧЕСТВО РАКЕТНЫХ ОПЕРАЦИОННЫХ БАЗ  
И РАКЕТНЫХ ВСПОМОГАТЕЛЬНЫХ ОБЪЕКТОВ  
(согласно Меморандуму о договоренности)

	СССР (1)						США (2)			
	(3) «РСД-10»	(4) «Р-12»	(5) «Р-14»	(6) «РК-55»	(7) «ОТР-22»	(8) «ОТР-23»	(9) «Першинг-3»	(10) «BOM-109G»	(11) «Першинг-1A»	(12) «Першинг-1B»
Ракетные операционные базы (13)	48	13	-	-	11 <sup>1</sup>	7 <sup>1</sup>	3 <sup>4</sup>	6 <sup>5</sup>	-	-
Объекты по производству ракет (14)	1	-	-	1	1	1	1	2	1	-
Объекты по производству ПУ (15)	1	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	-
Места складского хранения ракет (16)	-	-	1	-	4	1	3 <sup>6</sup>	-	1	-
Места складского хранения ПУ (17)	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-
Места складского хранения ракет ПУ (18)	12	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Места ремонта ракет (19)	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	1 <sup>7</sup>	-	-
Места ремонта ПУ (20)	-	-	-	-	-	-	4 <sup>8</sup>	-	1	-
Места ремонта ракет / ПУ (21)	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Испытательные полигоны (22)	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Места обучения (23)	3	-	-	-	3	3	1	2	-	-
Места ликвидации (24)	4	1	1	1	2	2	-	-	-	-
Итого <sup>1</sup> (25)	133						33			

<sup>1</sup> Суммарное количество является завышенным из-за повторного счета, так как некоторые ракетные вспомогательные объекты являются общими для нескольких типов ракет или используются одновременно для нескольких целей.

<sup>2</sup> В том числе 4 в ГДР, 1 в ЧССР.

<sup>3</sup> В том числе 2 в ГДР.

<sup>4</sup> Все в ФРГ.

<sup>5</sup> Из них 2 в Великобритании и по одной — в Италии, Бельгии, ФРГ и Нидерландах.

<sup>6</sup> Из них 1 в ФРГ.

<sup>7</sup> В Бельгии.

<sup>8</sup> Места ликвидации пока не определены.

Источник: составлено по Меморандуму о договоренности: разделы II—V.

Key: 1. USSR — 2. United States — 3. RSD-10 — 4. R-12 — 5. R-14 — 6. RK 55 — 7. OTR-22 — 8. OTR-23 — 9. Pershing — 10. BOM-109G — 11. Pershing IA — 12. Pershing IB — 13. Missile operating bases — 14. Missile-production facilities — 15. Launcher-production facilities — 16. Missile-storage facilities — 17. Launcher storage facilities — 18. Launcher & missile-storage facilities — 19. Missile-repair facilities — 20. Launcher-repair facilities — 21. Launcher & missile-repair facilities — 22. Test ranges — 23. Training facilities — 24. Elimination facilities — 25. Total

<sup>1</sup> The aggregate number is overstated on account of a multiple count since certain missile support facilities are common for several types of missiles or are used for several purposes.

<sup>2</sup> Including 4 in the GDR, 1 in the CSSR.

<sup>3</sup> Including 2 in the GDR.

<sup>4</sup> All in the FRG.

<sup>5</sup> Of them, 2 in Great Britain, 1 each in Italy, Belgium, the FRG and the Netherlands.

<sup>6</sup> Of them, 1 in the FRG.

<sup>7</sup> In Belgium.

<sup>8</sup> Elimination facilities not yet determined.

Source: compiled from the Memorandum of Understanding: sections II-V.

5. Article VII, clauses 2, 4.
6. Article VII, clause 8.
7. Article VII, clause 6.
8. Article VII, clause 3.
9. Article VII, clause 11.
10. Article VI, clause 1 (a, b).
11. Article VII, clause 12.
12. Article III, clauses 1, 2.
13. Article X, clause 6 (a, b).
14. Per the classification system adopted in the West, the SS-20.
15. Per the classification system adopted in the West, the SS-4.
16. Per the classification system adopted in the West, the SS-5.
17. Per the classification system adopted in the West, the SSC-X-4.
18. Per the classification system adopted in the West, the SS-12.
19. SIPRI data ("World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook 1986," Oxford, 1986, p 52).
20. Per the classification system adopted in the West, the SS-23.
21. Data of the International Institute for Strategic Studies ("Military Balance, 1986-1987," London, 1986, p 205).
22. Article VII, clause 10 (a).
23. Article VII, clause 10 (b).
24. Article VII, clause 10 (c).
25. Article VI, clause 1 (a, b). This prohibition does not extend to intermediate-range missiles inasmuch as a certain number of them may be destroyed by the launching method, article X, clause 5.
26. Per the classification system adopted in the West, the SS-25.
27. Article VI, clause 2.
28. Article IX, clause 3.
29. The deployment area is considered a designated area within which the intermediate-range missiles and their launchers may be operated. Deployment areas are not distinguished for shorter-range missiles, article II, clause 7.
30. A missile operating base is considered a complex of facilities at which the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and their launchers are usually operated. It is in fact a question of the launch sites of the corresponding missiles, article II, clause 8 (a, b).
31. Among them pertain facilities for the production of missiles and launchers and missile and launcher repair facilities; training facilities; missile and launcher storage facilities; test ranges; missile, launcher and corresponding support equipment elimination facilities, article II, clause 9; Memorandum of Understanding, Section I, clauses 1-9.
32. Article VIII, clause 5.
33. Article VIII, clauses 6, 7.
34. Article X, clause 6.
35. Article V, clause 1.
36. Article V, clause 2.
37. Article V, clause 3.
38. Article IV, clause 1.
39. Article IV, clause 2 (a).
40. It is a question of the Pershings (which as of 1 November 1987 constituted 35 percent of the total number of American intermediate-range missiles) not being reduced at a slow pace compared with the cruise missiles.
41. Article IV, clause 2 (b).
42. Protocol on Elimination, Section II, clause 9.
43. Protocol on Elimination, Section I, clauses 1, 2.
44. Protocol on Elimination, Section I, clauses 3, 4.
45. Protocol on Elimination, Section I, clause 5.
46. Protocol on Elimination, Section II, clause 3.
47. Protocol on Elimination, Section II, clause 10.
48. Article X, clause 5.
49. Protocol on Elimination, Section III, clauses 2, 3.
50. Protocol on Elimination, Section IV, clause 1 (d).

51. Protocol on Elimination, Section II, clause 10.
  52. Protocol on Elimination, Section V, clause 1.
  53. Protocol on Elimination, Section V, clause 2.
  54. Article X, clause 8.
  55. Article X, clause 9.
  56. Article IX, clause 5 (a).
  57. Article IX, clause 5 (b).
  58. Article IX, clause 5 (c).
  59. Article IX, clause 5 (d).
  60. Article IX, clause 5 (e).
  61. Article IX, clause 5 (f).
  62. Article IX, clause 6.
  63. Article X, clause 9.
  64. Protocol on Elimination, Section II, clause 2, Section IV, clause 3 (d).
  65. Protocol on Elimination, Section V, clause 2 (c).
  66. Protocol on Inspection, Section IV, clause 1 (a, b).
  67. Article IX, clause 2; Protocol on Inspection, Section IV, clause 1.
  68. Article XI, clause 3.
  69. Excluding missile-production facilities, for which a special inspection practice has been provided.
  70. Article XI, clause 4.
  71. Article XI, clause 5.
  72. Article XI, clause 7.
  73. Article XI, clause 8.
  74. Protocol on Elimination, Section V, clause 1 (c), clause 2 (d).
  75. Protocol on Elimination, Section V, clause 2 (d).
  76. Protocol on Elimination, Section II, clause 2; Section IV, clause 3 (c).
  77. Article XI, clause 6.
  78. Memorandum of Understanding, Section III, clause 2 (a/i); Section IV, clause 2 (a/i; aii).
  79. Memorandum of Understanding, Section III, clause 2 (b/i).
  80. Memorandum of Understanding, Section III, clause 2 (b/ii).
  81. Memorandum of Understanding, Section IV, clause 2 (b/i).
  82. Memorandum of Understanding, Section III, clause 2 (a/i); Section IV, clause 2 (a/i).
  83. Memorandum of Understanding, Section IV, clause 2 (a/ii).
  84. Memorandum of Understanding, Section V (a/i).
  85. Memorandum of Understanding, Section III, clause 2 (b/i); Section IV, clause 2 (b/i).
  86. Memorandum of Understanding, Section III, clause 2 (b/ii).
  87. Article XII, clause 3.
  88. Protocol on Inspection, Section III, clause 2.
  89. Protocol on Inspection, Section III, clause 5.
  90. Protocol on Inspection, Section I, clause 7.
  91. Protocol on Inspection, Section IV.
  92. Protocol on Inspection, Section V, clauses 3-4; Section VI, clauses 9-10.
  93. Protocol on Inspection, Section I, clause 7.
  94. Protocol on Inspection, Section V, clause 5.
  95. Protocol on Inspection, Section IX, clause 6.
  96. Protocol on Inspection, Section IX, clause 14 (c).
  97. PRAVDA, 9 December 1987.
- COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".  
"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988
- 8850
- FRG Marxist Institute Director on State Monopoly Capitalism**
- 18160006z [Editorial report] Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 88 pp 80-89 carries the article "Variants of the Development of State Monopolistic Capitalism" by Dr. Heinz Jung, director of the Institute of Marxist Studies in Frankfurt am Main,



preceded by an interview with Dr. Jung on the institute's work and research on Marxist and bourgeois political economy underway in the FRG. The interview was conducted by MEMO correspondent Yu. Yudanov; the date and place of the interview were not given. Dr. Jung responded to questions on the nature of the institute's work, its contacts with scientific research centers in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the main topics of research in other FRG scientific centers, and the current problems of the "bourgeois political economy of the FRG."

The main body of the article discusses the concept of variants of state monopolistic capitalism, the specific forms it takes, the general differences among them, and the effect on the working class of technological restructuring of the production, education, and management apparatus.

### Profile of George Bush

18160006v [Editorial report] Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, February 1988 pp 90-92 initiates a series of articles on the main participants in the U.S. "pre-election marathon" with a "portrait" of George Bush.

The article by I. Karaganova and D. Asnochenskiy entitled "George Bush—U.S. Presidential Candidate" states that "in the eyes of millions of future voters he emerges on the most experienced and competent political figure." It discusses his family history, his business and political career, including his tenure as CIA director:

"In November 1975 Bush was recalled from the Chinese People's Republic and was shortly thereafter appointed to the post of CIA director. These were difficult times for the CIA: it was just then that its secret subversive operations abroad were cause for indignation on the part of the public and legislators. Bush spent the main time while in his post as CIA director mending relations between the administration and Congress, striving to limit CIA operations severely and on a somewhat cosmetic reorganization of the agency itself."

In the 1979-80 presidential campaign Bush appeared as a leader of the old, traditional wing of the Eastern establishment, as a moderate, and a critic of Regan's economic program. As Vice President he has played an active role: "The clearest indicator of the growth of White House confidence in Bush was his appointment to the main group for regulating crisis situations and also Bush's numerous trips throughout the world as the president's plenipotentiary. This foreign policy activity became especially outstanding after he announced his candidacy for president. In numerous interviews and speeches Bush substantiates 'the need to use American ships to secure freedom of passage in the Persian Gulf' (like he unreservedly supported the U.S. invasion of

Grenada and the policy toward Lebanon at the time); in recent months he has repeatedly stated that he 'will stand shoulder to shoulder with the president' to the end."

The article concludes that "Bush's fate greatly depends on the possible successes and failures of the Reagan administration in the coming months."

### Economic Aspects of SDI

18160006y [Editorial report] Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 88 on pages 136-139 carries an article entitled "The Economic Aspects of SDI." H. Kunze (GDR) reviews the pros and cons of the SDI program with emphasis on its cost. He lists the firms participating in the program, indicating the number of their contracts, the cost of their orders, and the geographic distribution of expenditures on the SDI program. The data he uses are taken from Western publications. Kunze points out that "The realization of the space weapons program as early as its initial stage had lead to changes in the monopolistic structure of the U.S. economy. They are expressed in the growing concentration of the power of capital in the hands of a small number of concerns which occupy a central place in the military-industrial complex." He elaborates on the research expenditures on SDI, noting that only three percent of the annual expenditures are going into basic research which may be of use to the civilian sector.

### Nuclear-Free Zone for Mediterranean Advocated

18160006e Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 88 (signed to press 20 Jan 88) pp 149-151

[Ye. Cherkasova review: "The Mediterranean and International Security"]

[Text] The importance of the problem of Mediterranean security attracts the attention of both politicians and scholars. Radovan Vukadinovic's new book "The Mediterranean Between War and Peace" is of considerable interest in this connection. Its author is a well-known Yugoslav scholar and professor at the Institute of Developing Countries in Zagreb.

While speaking from positions of "equidistance" characteristic of Yugoslavia, as of the majority of other nonaligned countries also, and paying tribute to the terminology inherent in this concept, the scholar does not, for all that, equate the policy of the USSR, "which is indirectly associated with the Mediterranean," and the United States—a "non-Mediterranean power" (p 37).

The analysis of the situation in the region begins with an evaluation of its specific features and place and role in the system of contemporary international relations. The situation here is distinguished by constant tension. The conflicts—Near East, Cyprus and Greco-Turkish (over sovereignty over the Aegean), the civil war in Lebanon,

the Moroccan-Spanish rivalry over Ceuta and Melilla and the Anglo-Spanish dispute over Gibraltar—have assumed a chronic, protracted nature. Exacerbations of Algerian-Moroccan and Egyptian-Libyan relations are frequent. The struggle for national liberation and the creation of independent states (Palestinian and Western Saharan primarily) continues. Among the distinguishing features of the region R. Vukadinovic also puts the fact that strong, experienced West European communist parties operate and ideas of a socialist nature have gained considerable prevalence in Mediterranean countries. In addition, some of these states are encountering serious domestic political problems, including questions of regional autonomy, and also attempts to destabilize the situation inspired from outside.

Widespread varying forms of violence remain a specific and difficult problem here. The author rightly observes in this connection: "Only common political will and a recognition of the dangers lurking in terrorism, regardless of its aims and who resorts to it, can ensure unity of action and specific results" (p 32).

A serious impression on the situation in the Mediterranean is being made, the scholar believes, by the fact that this is the most militarized region of the world (p 7). The continued proliferation of arms there could lead to new military adventures, which, in turn, could upset the global structural balance. The high degree of militarization, he believes, is reflected in the efforts aimed at acquiring nuclear technology. Costly programs of the corresponding research, which could be used for military purposes also, are already being implemented in some Mediterranean states. We have to agree with the conclusion reiterated frequently in the book that the sole sensible solution in the current situation is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the conversion of the Mediterranean into a nuclear-free zone (pp 36, 147).

As far as the region's strategic importance is concerned, it is, as the work observes, a springboard for operations in Europe, Asia, the Atlantic, the Near East and North Africa. A consequence of this position, the author maintains, has been the Mediterranean's conversion into an arena of the global rivalry of the "superpowers," which are influencing primarily the countries of the region which have similar sociopolitical and economic systems to them or which associate their security to some extent with the military presence of the United States or the USSR (p 138). In this connection the professor considers it possible to speak of a "certain division of the Mediterranean into east and west, and the Soviet Union performs the dominant role in the eastern part, what is more, thanks to the combination of its naval, air and missile forces" (p 17).

The groundlessness of this proposition is obvious: after all, it is in the East Mediterranean that the United States' main military and political allies in the region—Israel, Egypt, Turkey—are located. In addition, the Soviet Union in no way aspires, as is known, to "domination"

in the region; its military presence here is dictated solely by the need to safeguard the security of its southern borders. The United States has created on the territory of Mediterranean countries (both western and eastern, what is more) 199 of its military facilities: 52 in Italy, 27 in Spain, 24 in Greece, 22 in Portugal, 4 in France and 2 in Morocco (p 42).

In the scholar's opinion, no one Mediterranean state or coalition thereof "could be a leading force in its waters." Non-Mediterranean countries, whose presence is conditioned by the constantly growing geostrategic significance of the region, have become such a force (pp 20-21). Proceeding from this proposition, R. Vukadinovic examines the situation in the Near East, paying particular attention to the role of the two great powers. The scholar emphasizes here that the main purpose of Washington's Near East policy is to distance the USSR from a settlement of the conflict and create the conditions for a Pax Americana. The United States' efforts aimed at "detaching" Syria from the Soviet Union and eliminating the PLO should be seen in this key. The achievement of both aims is impossible without a further strengthening of the United States' relations with Israel (pp 49-51).

One section of the book is devoted to an analysis of the policy of the EEC, which, in turn, is endeavoring to establish its presence in the region. Evaluating the positions of various political forces in the Europarlament, the author observes that the West European Christian democrats regard the EC's global Mediterranean policy as a means of doing away with "Soviet influence" in the region. The Gaullists in France see in it the possibility of the isolation of both "superpowers" and a strengthening of West European, primarily French, influence. Finally, social democratic politicians are endeavoring with the aid of economic "levers" to extend the positive results of European detente to the Mediterranean and thus contribute to the popularization of their ideas and concepts there (p 77). From the economic viewpoint the EC has scored big successes in relations with countries of the region. However, in the military-political sphere the Community cannot pursue a policy independent of the West's global strategy which would really make the Mediterranean a "European" sea (p 88).

The scholar's attention was also attracted to the problem of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. There is no other place in the Mediterranean where states which are so heterogeneous both from the viewpoint of socioeconomic system and in foreign policy orientation and defense posture are neighbors. A nuclear-free zone, he believes, would enhance the security of the Balkan countries and set an example to other regions (p 170).

The work rightly observes that from the U.S. viewpoint a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans is not a suitable means for maintaining the balance of forces. These fears increased particularly following the assumption of office

in Greece of the government of socialists (PASOK), whereupon there was a certain weakening of its relations with the United States within the NATO framework. Under these conditions the creation of a nuclear-free zone, Washington believes, could lead to the isolation of Turkey and the increased likelihood of Greece's rapprochement with the Soviet Union. A likely consequence is the growth of transatlantic pressure on Ankara for the purpose of keeping it from approving such an idea, and the maximum concession, furthermore, could be agreement to the incorporation in the zone merely of the European part of Turkey. The scholar's idea that subsequently a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans could be extended to and encompass the territory of Austria, Italy, Hungary, Cyprus and Malta (see p 199) is of interest.

In conclusion the author emphasizes that it would be wrong to put the blame for the tense situation in the Mediterranean only on the "superpowers". "But it is their presence," he believes, "which makes all Mediterranean crises—inspired both from outside and from within—an integral part of global international tension" (p 220).

We would note that the scholar occupies a very constructive position in respect of conflict-settlement methods. He believes that the necessary action program should be based on gradual steps aimed at ensuring equal security for all countries and a change in the current system of relations without advancement of the "Mediterranean for the Mediterraneans" or "Mediterranean Without the Superpowers" slogans. This program, he believes, should also provide for a gradual reduction in armed forces in the region and a corresponding lowering of tension. The latter would undoubtedly have an impact on international relations as a whole.

The Yugoslav professor advocates the introduction of confidence-building measures, including prior notification of military maneuvers and an exchange of observers, a freezing of and gradual reduction in the navies of non-Mediterranean countries (this applies primarily to ships carrying nuclear weapons and nuclear submarines), a freezing of the military budgets of all Mediterranean states, the nonexpansion of military alliances, a ban on the creation of new military bases and the gradual conversion of the entire vast region or the Near East, at least, into a nuclear-free zone (p 223). These recommendations coincide practically in full with the peace initiatives pertaining to the Mediterranean advanced by the USSR in recent years, of which the author makes no mention, unfortunately.

Although certain propositions of the work in question are contentious, its original factual material and thoroughness of analysis of highly pertinent issues are attractive.

#### Footnote

\* Belgrade, *Mezhdunarodna politika*, 1987, 234pp.

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#### Books in Brief

18160006f Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* in Russian  
NO 2, Feb 88 (signed to press 20 Jan 88) pp 153-157

[Excerpt] What determines the system of social measures of the bourgeois state; what are the approaches to the solution of social problems in the developed capitalist countries; what is the relationship in them between the economic and social spheres and the specific mechanism of their interaction—these and other questions are answered by a book prepared by scholars of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO, "The Social Policy of the Bourgeois State" (Doctor of Economic Sciences S.N. Nadel, exec. editor, Moscow, "Nauka", 208pp).

First about the specific features of the work. It differs from other publications on the same subject in several respects. First, a comparative analysis is made here of the social policy of several bourgeois states—the United States, Britain, France, the FRG and certain others—and it is described, furthermore, from the viewpoint of two main policies—bourgeois-liberal and conservative. Second, the authors study problems of social policy in an organic connection with a critical analysis of bourgeois interpretations of the subject in question. Third and finally, the authors of the annotated book concentrate their attention on the frontier of the 1970s-1980s period, when appreciable changes occurred in the said sphere of government activity in the industrially developed capitalist countries, in those in which conservative forces had assumed office in particular.

An idea of the scale of the state social system in the said group of countries is provided by the following data: in 19 OECD states spending on social needs (retirement pensions, health care, education, unemployment benefit, housing assistance and such) in 1981 as a percentage of GNP varied from 14.9 in Switzerland to 38 in Belgium. In the United States this spending (including federal, state and local authority) increased from 1950 through 1980 (adjusted for inflation) by a factor of 6.7—from \$84.6 billion to \$491.4 billion (see p 22).

The formation of the state-run social services sector has provided food for bourgeois social scientists, the book observes, to indulge in a variety of speculative reasoning on the subject of the "supraclass" nature of the bourgeois state, which is allegedly concerned for the welfare of all people and the well-being of the whole society (see p 13). This is not, of course, the case. Nonetheless, what is it



that compels the powers that be in developed capitalist countries to spend such huge amounts on the social sphere? An unusual, but convincing answer to this question is provided by an aphorism attributed to former U.S. President John Kennedy: if the "free," that is, bourgeois, "society cannot help the many poor, it will not save the few rich" (see p 6).

The above aphorism laconically defines the class essence of the social policy of the bourgeois state not only within the framework of one country but in the international arena also, particularly when bourgeois theorists speak about the ways of economic and social development of former colonial and dependent countries and the emergence of their peoples from a state of backwardness and poverty. There are both in the West and in the emergent countries themselves many theories on these problems. One is comprehensively examined in M.V. Kozyrev's book "In Search of New Development Models ('Basic Requirements' Concept)" (Moscow, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury izdatelstva "Nauka", 1987, pp 148). We would note primarily that its novelty and significance is the fact that the concept of development which is analyzed has not hitherto been an independent subject of study in the works of Soviet scholars. As far as this subject itself is concerned, however, the said concept had been formulated, as the annotated work observes, by the mid-1970s, in the main. It differs from preceding development theories based mainly on prescriptions of economic growth ("catch-up development," for example) in that it is of a social, qualitative nature. Its purpose is "the adoption of urgent measures to do away with poverty and hunger and raise the living standard of the poorest strata of the population of the young states on the basis of the elimination of inequality in the internal distribution of income" (p 11). And that such inequality exists, despite a certain economic growth in these states, is shown by the data adduced in the monograph. Thus from 1955 through 1970 the income of the poorest 20 percent of the population declined in absolute terms in almost all developing countries (see p 8). Does this not testify to the property polarization occurring there—against the background of economic growth?

Revealing the reasons for the emergence and spread of the "basic requirements" concept, the author adduces figures convincingly showing the truly catastrophic position of enormous masses of the population of the developing world. It is sufficient to say that approximately 750 million persons were living under conditions of "absolute poverty," 700 million were suffering from hunger and significant undernourishment and the army of unemployed and partially employed constituted approximately 300 million persons by the mid-1970s in the former colonies and dependent states (see *ibid.*).

The book discusses in detail how scholars of the developed capitalist and developing countries are treating the concept studied therein; how its ideas are being realized in practice in individual states; and how they are being reflected in the activity of international organizations. It

is noted, in particular, that bourgeois, primarily conservative, interpretations of "basic requirements" are prevalent in the latter (see p 113). The analysis of the attitude toward the said concept at the international policy level on the part of various groups of states is of undoubted interest also. As far as Soviet economic diplomacy is concerned, since the time this concept appeared in the set of problems discussed in the international arena it has adhered, as M. Kozyrev writes, "to a scrupulous and at the same time flexible position," supporting progressive interpretations and evaluating critically pro-imperialist and liberal-utopian interpretations (see pp 127-128).

The establishment of postwar economic difficulties in Britain and its lag behind other developed capitalist countries had become a commonplace almost. It is well known also that the stagnant nature of the process of production and the accumulation of capital in the British Isles was connected with the disintegration of the British colonial empire, London's ambitious foreign policy after WWII, the militarization of the economy and other factors. But far from as well known are the specific realities of the crisis economic situation which had taken shape in Great Britain and which lasted right up until the 1980's and also the management and political-economic factors which caused it. V.B. Studentsov's book "Great Britain: the State and the Accumulation of Fixed Capital" (Doctor of Economic Sciences I.M. Osadchaya, exec. editor, Moscow, "Nauka", 1987, 134pp) is devoted to a study thereof, based mainly on the example of manufacturing industry, and also an analysis and evaluation of government measures to overcome the crisis.

Thirty years ago R.P. Dutt, prominent figure of the British workers movement, wrote that the former "workshop of the world" had begun to change increasingly into the "warehouse of obsolete equipment". The monograph adduces together with this statement an extract from an annual economic report of the British TUC, testifying that the situation as regards fixed capital had not changed by the 1980s either: "A significant amount of the equipment of a typical British textile factory would interest the Japanese and the Germans merely as museum pieces" (see p 26). True, together with this the voices are also being heard in Britain of those who maintain that Britain "is choked up with the most modern costly equipment, which is simply not being used" (see p 27). We, for our part, would add, incidentally, the one is at times perfectly at home with the other, as is known from our own experience.

The problem of low returns from fixed capital in Great Britain was brought about not only by a sizable increase in installed equipment but also by the nature of its use. The annotated work adduces the results of a survey conducted in the mid-1970s at 186 plants, which show that "on average approximately 30 percent only of the time consumed in producing an article was spent on production operations proper. The remaining 70 percent of the time was spent waiting. This situation led to a

significant excess in the normal level of necessary stocks and incomplete production and the long time taken to realize orders. Never mind that the deadlines were long, they were unreliable also—only one out of every five British plants fulfilled 20 percent of its orders on schedule. According to other estimates, equipment in Great Britain's engineering functions usually for 65-75 percent of a shift compared with 85 percent in the United States and the FRG and 95 percent in Japan" (p 31).

The following paradoxical fact is adduced also: the transition to machine tools with numerical programmed control led in individual instances to a lowering of the efficiency of labor input of 50 and sometimes of 75 percent. This reduction in productivity upon the transition to modern equipment was associated with the fact that, as distinct from conventional machine tools, which functioned for approximately 40 percent of the work day, the machine tools with numerical programmed control were in operation for only half the time—approximately 20 percent (see *ibid.*).

Establishing that throughout the postwar period British industry was inferior to its competitors in dynamism of development and level of efficiency, V. Studentsov sees as the reason for the situation a whole set of factors. Among them he cites, in particular, the following: insufficient investment and innovation activity, inadequate organization of the labor and production process, the inadequate skills of the personnel and the neglected state of the infrastructure (see pp 33-34). Under these conditions a central component of government economic strategy was a policy of control of the process of the accumulation of fixed capital. Evaluating this policy, the author concludes that the basis of its low efficiency were not only and not so much blunders in a tactical respect as the narrowness and contradictoriness immanent to government interference in the economy.

And we would note in conclusion that the annotated book differs from other Soviet works on these problems not only in that the author analyzes the set of methods and means of government influence on the accumulation of fixed capital but also in the presence of an evaluation of their fruitfulness.

In the contemporary social life in the West mass, originally ecological, protest has become an authoritative political movement. The monograph "The Modern World Through the Eyes of the 'Greens'" (under the general editorship of B.M. Maklyarskiy, Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987, 232pp) is devoted to an analysis of this phenomenon. It examines the sources, conceptual basis and program of the new sociopolitical formation within whose framework there is active criticism of the bourgeois system and plans for changes in the modern world alternative to the existing socioeconomic systems are put forward. The most authoritative section of the "alternativists" is the "green" movement, which in a comparatively short time

has acquired a party-political structure and is now operating actively in many West European countries. In Austria, the Austrian Alternative List, in Belgium, the Ecolo-(Agayev) party bloc, in the FRG and France, green parties, in Ireland, the Green Alliance, in Luxembourg, the Green Alternative Party, in Sweden, the Environmental Protection Party, in Holland, the Green Progressive Agreement party bloc, in Britain, the Ecology Party. In the United States, American specialists estimate, "there are from 1,600 to 2,000 organizations which, judging by the aims and nature of their activity, may be considered green. These organizations number about 2 million members" (see p 130).

While evaluating critically the "greens" program principles, the authors call attention to the fact that the communist parties in West European countries consider cooperation with them essential, primarily within the framework of the peace movement, although they do not conceal "their disagreement with certain propositions contained in the alternativists' foreign policy platform" (see p 219).

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